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ABSTRACT
Our model examines the allocation of medical research funds at the National 
Institutes of Health using public interest theory, incremental budgeting theory, and 
special interest group theory. We use the allocation of research funds among various 
diseases and measures of the burden of disease on the population to test the hypothesis 
that the N.I.H. is allocating funds on a pure public interest basis, to test for incremental 
budgeting effects, and to test for the influence of lobbying and other political variables 
representing special interest groups. We use pooled cross-sectional, time-series data 
in a one-way fixed effects model, and also use separate cross-sectional data in a 
standard multiple regression model. We also evaluate the effect of political variables 
on the distribution of research funds among the states.
We find evidence to support the public interest, incremental budgeting, and 
special interest group theories of regulation in the operation of the N.I.H. Using the 
pooled data sets, we find that the N.I.H. does not respond to changes in death patterns 
over time, but does consider death patterns in the initial allocation of funding across 
diseases. Funding increases primarily as a result of incremental budgeting. However, 
using the more recent and more inclusive cross-sectional disease data, we find that the 
burden of disease, whether measured by deaths, years of life lost, or hospital stays, 
does matter in the allocation of funding among diseases, which is evidence that the 
N.I.H. does consider the public interest when making funding decisions. We also find, 
however, that the allocation among diseases is impacted by lobbying dollars, and that 
the allocation across states is influenced by political factors, both of which provide 
support for the special interest group theory of regulation.
x




The National Institutes of Health (N.I.H.) is a politically popular agency which 
receives budget increases even in years when agency budgets in general are being cut.1 
Even though the N.I.H. has received a real increase in its budget every year since 
1982, it is still not possible for the agency to fund all or even most of the proposals it 
receives. In fact, the N.I.H. rejects three out of every four research proposals it 
receives.2 How does the National Institutes of Health determine which diseases 
should receive research funding, and in what amounts?
The N.I.H. is the largest biomedical research institution in the world. The 
decisions made by the N.I.H. potentially affect the future health of every American. 
Choosing to fund research for malaria rather than pancreatic cancer, for example, may 
benefit some Americans and penalize others. Consequently, Americans have a very 
personal interest in understanding the decision-making process of the N.I.H. This 
dissertation attempts to explain, at least in part, the decisions reached by the N.I.H..
The National Institutes of Health is part of the Public Health Service in the 
Department of Health and Human Services. The N.I.H. has grown into a complex 
agency employing over 19,000 people with a budget of $20.3 billion.3
'Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics o f the Budgetary Process, 4* ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1984), 33.
National Institutes of Health, “Setting Research Priorities at the National Institutes of Health,” 
prepared by the Working Group on Priority Setting (Bethesda, Md.: National Institutes of Health, 
1997), Internet. Available from http://www.N.I.H..gov/news/Res Prioritv/nrioritv.htm (accessed 9 
October 1998).
}Setting Research Priorities, p. 9-10.
1
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The N.I.H. is headquartered on a 300-acre campus in Bethesda, Maryland. The 
N.I.H. is a collection of twenty-six individual institutes and divisions, which are listed 
in Table 1.1. In addition to the institutes, the N.I.H. also operates on-site a 350-bed 
research hospital, a clinical center with extensive outpatient programs, a research 
center for medical students, the Fogarty Center for international cooperation in 
science, and the National Library of Medicine. The latter is the largest medical library 
in the world.
The N.I.H. also has numerous facilities away from Bethesda. These include 
the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences in North Carolina, the N.I.H. 
Animal Center in Poolesville, Maryland, a gerontology Research Center and an 
Addiction Center in Baltimore, and the Rocky Mountain Laboratory in Montana.
The N.I.H. funds research by its employees at its own facilities, which is 
intramural funding, and accounts for only about eleven percent of the current budget. 
Most of the money received by the N.I.H. goes to fund scientists and researchers 
working at universities, medical schools, and hospitals around the country. Currently 
about seventy-five percent of the total money received by the N.I.H. is paid to these 
scientists working on extramural grants. The remaining funds (less than fifteen 
percent) go for support costs.4
The N.I.H. provides funding for over 50,000 researchers working on over 
35,000 extramural Research Project Grants (RPG’s). Table 1.2 shows the number of 
RPG’s and the total RPG funding for each of the last ten years. The RPG is the most
4 National Institutes of Health, “N.LH. Almanac 1999,” prepared by the Editorial Operations Branch 
(Bethesda, Md.: National Institutes ofHealth, Pub. No. 99-5, 1999), 116-158.
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Table 1.1 
N.I.H. Institutes And Centers
Year Acronym Name of Institute or Center
1930 0D Office of the Director
1937 NCI National Cancer Institute
1944 NLM National Library of Medicine
1946 CSR Center for Scientific Review
1948 NHLBI National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
1948 NIDCR
National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial 
Research
1948 CC Warren Grant Magnuson Clinical Center
1949 NIMH National Institute of Mental Health
1950 NIAMS
National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal 
and Skin Diseases
1950 NINDS
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and 
Stroke
1958 NIGMS National Institute of General Medical Sciences
1962 NICHD
National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development
1965 NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
1968 NEI National Eye Institute
1968 FIC Fogarty International Center
1974 NIA National Institute of Aging
1974 NIAAA National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
1974 NIAID
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases
1974 NIDA National Institute of Drug Abuse
1986 NIDDK
National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and 
Kidney Disease
1986 NINR National Institute of Nursing Research
1988 NIDCD
National Institute of Deafness and Other 
Communication Disorders
1990 NHGRI National Human Genome Research Institute
1990 NCRR National Center for Research Resources
1992 NCCAM
National Center for Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine
1998 err Center for Information Technology
Source: Office of Communications and Public Liaison, N.LH. Almanac 1999.
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Table 1.2
N.LH. Extramural Awards By Activity 


















1988 22.107 S 4,021,486 714 S 627,297 1,252 S 600,594
1989 22,752 4,3%,635 725 673,670 u u 697,489
1990 22,504 4,638,602 728 715,638 1332 777,432
1991 23,352 5,057,591 795 797,673 1,362 793,189
1992 24,033 5.494.152 865 893,798 1,232 866,874
1993 23,952 5,659,458 899 910,562 1,328 861,925
1994 24,964 5.964,779 985 985,549 1,126 1.001.809
1995 24,899 6,151,615 933 1,020,703 1,091 1,016,911
19% 25,519 6,538.580 928 1,049,893 1,296 994,259
1997 26,936 9,046,500 940 1,088,546 1,167 939,700
1998 28,439 9,801,900 915 1.195,763 1.169 894.800
1999 31,150 11,228,700 989 1.424,083 1,191 1,045,200
2000 38,303 13.002.461 1,026 1,605,613 1,133 1.123,000
Source: Office of Extramural Research, N. .H. Awards by N.LH. Component and
funding Mechanism.
common method of funding extramural research. RPG’s are initiated by the 
researcher. The N.LH. has several types of RPG's designed to give the institutes 
flexibility in the awards process. Generally, all awards are classified as competing 
awards in their first year of support; if support is continued for longer than twelve 
months, the award is then reclassified as non-competing. Each year, about seventy- 
five percent of the total RPG’s are non-competing. Of the new unsolicited proposals 
submitted each year, the N.I.H. funds only about one-fourth.5
The N.I.H. does not rely exclusively on investigator-initiated proposals to 
determine the direction of medical research. The N.I.H. actively seeks proposals in 
areas it designates “high priority or special concern.” Program Announcements and 
Requests for Applications are the two methods used by the N.LH. to stimulate 
research interest in areas it would like to fund.
’ibid
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Research Project Grant proposals are subject to a multi-level peer review 
process. Initially, applications are reviewed by groups of non-government scientists 
(called study sections) and are ranked using a loose criteria structure of significance, 
approach, innovation, investigator, and institutional environment. Generally, the peer- 
review process occurs in the Center for Scientific Review, but N.I.H.-solicited grant 
applications are usually reviewed by the institute which solicited them. Each 
application, regardless of where it is reviewed, is assigned a numerical ranking from 
100 to 500, with 100 being the best. Applications with a rank of 300-500 are not 
routinely forwarded to institutes for further consideration.
The proposals with the lowest (best) scores are then passed on for further 
review by the individual institutes or centers. Each institute and center has its own 
National Advisory Council, which makes funding recommendations. The Councils do 
not have to follow the peer review ranking, and are free to consider other factors in 
the award process. The Council is composed not only of scientists from the institute, 
but also of members of the public with an interest in the research of the institute.
Although RPG’s constitute the bulk of N.LH. extramural funding, the N.I.H. 
also spends substantial amounts of money funding research center grants. These 
grants are generally larger than RPG’s, employ several people, and are made to a 
research center to do medical research in a clinical application setting. In addition to 
center grants, the N.LH. also establishes a number of research and development 
contracts each year, designed to expand research into areas promoted by the N.I.H.. 
R&D contracts are overseen by an N.LH. staff member, but the research is done by an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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outside organization. Funding for center grants and research and development 
contracts is also shown in Table 1.2.
The funding process for research proposals, research centers, and research and 
development contracts is only part of the complex N.LH. budget and research funding 
allocation process. The N.I.H. does not receive a block of funding which it may 
allocate among the various divisions or even among various research projects. The 
N.I.H. prepares and presents to Congress each year a proposed budget, for the N.LH. 
as a whole and for each individual institute, center and division. Congress and the 
Administration both tinker with the figures, often altering spending for specific 
diseases or projects, as well as those for centers or institutes. Indeed, Congress is 
closely involved in the very structure of the N.I.H., as well as in its funding. Congress 
authorizes the creation of a new institute or center whenever it feels a disease or group 
of diseases needs a higher priority in the funding process. For example, Congress last 
December authorized the creation of a new institute, the National Institute of 
Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering, even though the (then) Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services objected, citing duplication of effort and 
increased administrative costs in such a move.
There is not a grand plan for medical research at the N.LH. There is no board 
or body to oversee the entirety of research funding allocation. Each institute prepares 
its own budget based on guidelines from the federal Office of Management and 
Budget. Budget proposals to Congress are based on initial expectations of which 
projects will be funded, and for how much; Congress then adjusts the budget 
according to its own goals. Congress frequently holds hearings on funding levels for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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particular diseases or centers and invites public participation. The N.LH. also 
encourages patient advocacy groups and other members of the public to have input 
into the budget process.
Once a budget has been agreed upon, the Director of the N.I.H. still has some 
leeway in altering the budget. The Director can move up to one percent of the N.I.H. 
total funding among the institutes as he sees fit. In addition, the Director also has a 
discretionary fund, which he can use to fund projects outside the regular RPG process.
In this study, I will examine the allocation of research funds among the various 
diseases by the N.I.H. I seek to answer the following questions: Does the N.LH. 
allocate funding according to the burden of disease on society? How much influence 
does politics have in allocation decisions? Does the lobbying of special interest 
groups affect the allocation of research funds among the various diseases? Does the 
distribution of research funds among research institutions across the country depend 
on political influence, or can it be explained by objective criteria?
1.2 Theory
Biomedical research is a service demanded by the public because of the 
benefits of improved health and longer life that result from such research. The N.LH. 
is the largest single supplier of biomedical research in the world. Thus the allocation 
of the N.I.H. budget among various research projects (i.e., various diseases) can be 
analyzed in the context of a demand and supply framework. The N.LH. is a federal 
agency, part of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), which is a 
Cabinet department under the nominal control of the Administration. However, the 
N.LH. is dependent upon Congress for all its funding; therefore, the agency must
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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respond to pressures from the Congress, which in turn must respond to the wishes of 
voters and special interest groups. It is reasonable to assume that both the Congress 
and the N.LH. itself have some discretionary power in determining budget levels and 
the allocation o f funds among the various institutes and various diseases.
1.2.1 Simple Public Interest Theory of Biomedical Research Funding
The simplest theory which could explain the allocation of N.I.H. research 
funds among various diseases would be a pure public interest theory. Public interest 
theory hypothesizes an altruistic motivation for the behavior of bureaucrats and 
politicians; that is, they run the government (or the federal agency) in such a way as to 
obtain the greatest good for the greatest number. Under such a system, the public 
would demand research on those diseases which impose the greatest burden on 
society. In this idealistic world, the decision-makers at the N.I.H allocate research 
funds on the basis of some burden of disease measure, such as deaths, hospital stays, 
or cost of treatment.
The theoretical framework of the analysis of N.I.H. research funding allocation 
under a pure public interest theory model would be that of a constrained optimization 
problem, such as the model developed by Lichtenberg (199S). Lichetnberg's model 
makes no allowance for the influence of Congressional politics or special interest 
groups. His model, then, would explain only the relationship between research 
funding allocation and some burden of disease measure representing the voters' 
interest In Lichtenberg's model, policymakers want to maximize the total number of 
people cured of disease subject to the research budget constraint The objective 
function is:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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J* = N,P! + N2P2 
= N,X,a + N2X2a 
where:
J* = Number of people cured
Ni = Number of people with disease i
X = Xi + X2 = Total research budget
Pi = fl(Xj) = Probability of finding a cure, which depends only on research funding.
The assumption that the probability of finding a cure is the same for all 
diseases does not reflect the realities which exist in scientific research. However, 
allowing the probability of success in research to vary by disease demands a method 
of estimating these probabilities, which is not currently available. Also, the United 
States has no reliable sources for either the incidence or prevalence of many diseases. 
Neither the Centers for Disease Control, the National Center for Health Statistics, nor 
any other federal agency collects such data. Estimates of the number of people who 
suffer from a disease (the disease population) are, except in rare cases, only guesses. 
Thus, measures of the burden of disease must be restricted to forms such as total 
deaths or hospital discharges, for which data are available. Because of the lack of data 
on both disease populations and the probabilities of successful research, Lichtenberg's 
model is approximated by estimating the relationship between research funding for a 
disease and some obtainable measure of the burden of disease. We have done this in 
Chapter 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1.2.2 Expanded Theory of Biomedical Research Funding
In reality, the N.LH. does not operate in a ivory tower, devoted to serving the 
public interest, removed from the influence of politicians, scientists, or patient 
advocacy groups. Lichtenberg's model must be modified to reflect the political reality 
of the world in which the N.I.H. operates. We expand Lichtenberg's model to include 
not only variables which measure the burden of disease, but also those representing 
the forces of politics and special interest groups. The following system of equations 
can be used to identify and isolate determinants of the allocation of N.LH. funds: 
Demand N.LH. Research Fundsit = D(VIit, SIGu, St) (1.1)
Supply N.LH. Research Fundsit = S(CONGPOL„ NfflSUB;,, NIHPOL,, PAt) (1.2)
N.LH. Research Funds;, = Demand N.LH. Funds^ = Supply N.LH. Funds;, (1.3) 
N.LH. Research Fundsit = fl(VIit, SIGit, CONGPOL,) (1.4)
where
VI„ = Voters’ (public) interest in research on disease i in year t
SIGjf = Special Interest Group pressure for research on disease i in year t
S, = Relative political power of voters and special interest groups in year t
CONGPOL, = Congressional politics in year t
NIHSUB,, = N.LH. grant submissions for research on disease / in year t 
NIHPOL, = Internal politics at N.LH. in year t 
PA, = Principal-Agent relationship with Congress in year t
1.2.2.1 The Demand Equation
According to Equation 1.1, the demand for N.LH. research funding for disease 
i in year t depends on voters' interest (VI;,), the pressures of special interest groups
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(SIGit), and the structure of the political system with respect to the relative political 
power of voters and interest groups (St). Let us consider the measurement of each of 
these variables and their relationships to the allocation of N.I.H. grants.
The inclusion of a public or voters' interest variable in Equation 1.1 is based on 
the assumption that, at least in part, the allocation of public funds to biomedical 
research is done to maximize the public welfare. It is also reasonable to assume that 
communicable diseases will draw more public support than diseases which affect only 
an isolated population. Members of the public make their demands known through 
their votes, as well as expressions of concern to both Congress and the N.I.H. directly. 
To serve the public's or voters' interest, the N.I.H. will be forced to allocate additional 
funds to those diseases which have the greatest impact on the public.
The N.LH. is a federal agency whose budget is determined each year by 
Congress. The N.I.H., in fact, does not have a global budget which is divided up by 
scientists working only for the good of the public. The N.I.H. submits a separate 
budget request for each center and institute (twenty-six in all). Both the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress can adjust the total amount for each 
institute, as well as the allocation of each institute's budget to various diseases. In 
addition, Congress can and does dictate specific amount of money to be dedicated to 
specific research topics. These are called Congressional directives.
Thus, the theory must be adjusted to allow for the goals and objectives of 
individual member of Congress, as well as politicians in the Executive Branch. The 
input of politicians must be considered, and their goal may in fact be to get re-elected, 
not to improve the public welfare. Consequently, the influence of voters and special
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interest groups will determine the amount of interference by Congress or Executive 
Branch appointees in the research allocation process. These groups or individuals 
have goals which may or may not be compatible with the public interest. People who 
suffer from a disease, say, diabetes, will have an incentive to urge Congress to allocate 
additional funds for diabetes research. The benefit to them will be large, while the 
cost of research will be spread over the entire tax base. As a result patient advocacy 
groups will each be motivated to act to increase research funding for their disease. 
The allocation that results from their activities may not be the welfare-maximizing 
allocation.
The literature on the theory of regulation and special interest groups, as 
developed by Becker (1983), Olson (1965), Peltzman (1976), Stigler (1971), and 
Wilson (1974) fits well with a cursory examination of the funding process for the 
N.I.H.. Wilson noted that the funding of kidney dialysis under the Medicare program 
was a triumph of an interest group and reflected the truth of the concentrated benefits 
and diverse costs philosophy.6
Mancur Olson in The Logic o f Collective Action (1965) analyzed the 
motivation behind the process of groups, noting that political power is vested in a 
number of powerful special interest groups, none of which represent the majority of 
the voters or citizens of the United States. The potential gain to any individual from 
lobbying efforts is quite large; on the other hand, there is a substantial free rider 
problem in large groups. Consequently, small groups will win benefits at the expense
6 James Wilson, “The Politics of Regulation,” in Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament 
(Washington, D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 1974), 135-136.
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of large, unorganized groups. Olson explained the political power of small business 
groups, unions, and professional associations using this model.
George Stigler developed a model of special interest group theory in ‘The 
Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971). Stigler argues that the public interest view 
of regulation does not explain most economic regulation and ignores political reality. 
The special interest group has much greater motivation to seek beneficial regulation 
than the general public does to oppose it: the benefits for the interest group members 
will be substantial, while the cost to any individual member of society will be quite 
small. Therefore, the incentive of any individual to work to prevent special group 
regulation is negligible.
Becker (1983) further developed Stigler’s theory. He concurred with Stigler 
that politically successful groups tend to be small relative to the size of the groups 
taxed to pay their subsidies. Only groups that are efficient at eliminating free riding 
become politically powerful, which parallels the concentrated benefits, diverse costs 
philosophy. Special interest groups purchase votes in legislatures through lobbying 
and other political activities. Peltzman (1984) used a simple principal-agent model to 
explain voting behavior by members of Congress. Congressmen respond to the 
interests of those who contribute to the election effort, through donations or political 
activity. Peltzman concludes that legislators are not shirking; they are representing the 
interests of the groups which got them elected. Special interest group theory is 
rational.
Special Interest Groups (SIG) can be expected to lobby the Congress (and the 
N.I.H.) and to provide campaign contributions and votes to members of Congress in
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pursuit of increased funding for particular diseases. In this study, we proxy the 
influence of advocacy groups by a simple registered lobbyist dummy variable and 
additional dummy variables indicating the level of lobbying expenditures.
The structure of the political system (S) reflects the relative political power of 
voters and special interest groups. This balance of power may be altered over time. It 
is widely believed that the legalization of political action committees (PACs) in 1973, 
which were subsequently confirmed by the courts, may have enhanced the relative 
power of interest groups. Similarly, recent proposed changes in campaign finance 
laws may alter the relative power of interest groups in the future. For our observation 
period, no major changes were enacted in campaign finance law, so this variable is 
excluded from our final reduced-form Equation 1.4.
1.2.2.2 The Supply Equation
According to Equation 1.2, the supply of N.I.H. research funds to disease i in 
year t depends on Congressional politics (CONG-POLt), N.I.H. grant submissions 
(NIH-SUBit), N.I.H. politics (NIH-POLt), and the principal-agency relationship (PAt) 
between Congress and the N.I.H. The congressional political factors which may 
influence the allocation of N.I.H. research grants across diseases from year to year 
include: (1) which political parties control the House, Senate, and Presidency, (2) 
who chairs particular committees in the Congress; (3) the member composition of the 
committees and their geographic constituency of voters and special interest groups. 
Data on congressional political factors is available and is included in our model. A 
final aspect of congressional politics which influences N.I.H. grant expenditures is the 
concept of "incremental budgeting."
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When examining the budgeting process by agencies o f the federal government, 
the starting point is the incremental budgeting model developed by Aaron Wildavsky 
in his 1964 book The Politics o f the Budgetary Process. Wildavsky demonstrated that 
government bureaus do not use zero base budgeting; that is, beginning with a budget 
of zero dollars and evaluating each program expenditure each year in comparison with 
all other possible programs. Furthermore, he suggested that doing so is not efficient, 
given the size and complexity of the federal budgeting process. Instead, agencies 
modify the previous year's budget in relatively inconspicuous ways, gradually 
expanding existing programs or requesting small amounts for new programs. This 
process generally results in slowly expanding budgets; the incremental change may be 
either large or small, but it is still an incremental increase in last year's funding. We 
analyze the incrementalism present in the N.I.H. budget by comparing trends of 
institute budgets.
Wildavsky also incorporated some special interest theory into his work, 
discussing the importance of building relationships with key Congressmen, those who 
sit on the committees overseeing an agency, or on the powerful appropriations 
committees. He noted that committee recommendations on agency budgets are almost 
always accepted by the entire chamber.7 In addition, Wildavsky emphasized the 
importance of building an identifiable clientele for agency services, and making sure 
the agency clientele provides positive feedback to Congress on the agency's behalf. In 
particular, Wildavsky noted that the N.I.H. would sometimes cut requested funding for 
popular research programs, such as cancer research funding, when asking for increases 
in administrative expenses or less popular items such as dental research; their
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expectation was that Congress would restore the politically popular cancer funding. 
They were correct.
In theory, the N.I.H. is responsible to Congress, which approves the N.I.H. 
budget, monitors its decisions, and helps to set its policies. The N.I.H. is therefore an 
agent which represents its principals' (i.e., the Congress) interests. The nature of this 
principal/agent relationship may change over time in response to perceived crises and 
changes in public opinion; Congress may become more or less active in its supervision 
of the N.I.H. from period to period. In our observation period, Congress exercised a 
high level of control over the budgeting process of the various N.I.H. Institutes and 
Centers. In addition, Congress maintained the power to specifically order research on 
a partial disease or spending in a certain area, which they exercised from time to time. 
They did not pass any legislation altering their degree of control over the N.I.H., or 
charging the administrative status of the N.I.H. Therefore, because no significant 
changes occurred in the nature of the N.I.H./Congress relationship, we can drop the 
CONGPOL variable in our final reduced-form Equation 1.4.
Most of the N.LH.'s funding for research is allocated through external 
Research Project Grants (RPG's). RPG's are initiated by research proposal submitted 
by non-N.I.H. researchers. Thus, the allocation of N.I.H. research funds to disease 
categories is in part dependent on the research proposals submitted to the N.I.H. 
(NIHSUB). However, there is no data available to the public on the proposals 
submitted but not approved for funding (about seventy-five percent of proposals 
submitted). Consequently, we make no attempt to model such submissions, so that 
NIHSUB is not included in our final reduced-form Equation 1.4.
7 Wildavsky, 51.
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N.I.H. politics (NIHPOL) also plays a role in the allocation of research dollars. 
The N.I.H. does not rely exclusively on investigator-initiated proposals to determine 
the direction of medical research. The N.I.H. actively seeks proposals in areas it 
designates “high priority or special concern.” Program Announcements (PA) and 
Requests for Applications (RFA) are the two methods used by the N.I.H. to stimulate 
research interest in areas it would like to fund. However, the process underlying the 
decision to issue a PA or RFA is not made known to the public; consequently, this 
variable is not included in our final model.
1.2.23 Equilibrium Determination
According to Equation 1.3 of our model, the allocation of N.I.H. research 
funding among diseases will be determined by an equilibrium between the demand for 
and supply of such funding. Like previous researchers, we do not attempt to estimate 
the structural Equations 1.1 and 1.2 because of difficulty in obtaining the relevant 
data. Many of the theoretical structural variables are omitted from the reduced-form 
equations either because they did not change over the observation period or no 
empirical proxy variable was available to capture their effects. Therefore, we are 
forced to estimate variations of the reduced-form Equation 1.4 using different data 
sets. Nevertheless, the estimated reduced-form equations are far more sophisticated 
and theoretically complete than previous models that have been estimated to explain 
the allocation of N.I.H. research funds.
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
The allocation of government medical research funding is not a topic which 
has been extensively studied, primarily because of the lack of useable data. Most 
analyses of the National Institutes of Health which have been undertaken have focused 
on areas other than the social welfare economics of research funding. Analyses of the 
special interest and political factors impacting the National Institutes of Health are 
more plentiful, but the lack of hard data has been a problem for them, also.
2.2 General Medical Research Funding
Some of the earliest work on the social welfare economics of medical research 
was done by Weisbrod (1961). He theorized that medical research funding should be 
allocated according to some definable mechanism based on a goal of improving the 
public welfare. Weisbrod did groundbreaking work in the area of quantifying the cost 
of disease: the lost production from premature death and from sickness and the direct 
costs of treatment. His approach was unique in that he noted that “in addition to the 
loss o f a producer, a death also involves the loss of a consumer.”1 Consequently, 
Weisbrod used the value of future earning net of consumption when calculating the 
cost of premature death. He also justified the concept that research expenditures 
should be allocated proportionally to diseases based on the death rates from those 
diseases, as the best approximation of equating the marginal benefits and marginal 
costs of research on various diseases. His was a pure public interest theory
1 Burton A. Weisbrod, Economics o f Public Health (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1961), 35.
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application. The flaws in Weisbrod’s work stem from his scanty data. He examines 
only three diseases: cancer, poliomyelitis and tuberculosis; and he uses data only for 
1954. While he finds that the allocation of research to each disease does not 
correspond proportionally to the deaths from those diseases, his limited data makes it 
very difficult to reject the public interest theory as a motive for public medical 
research spending.
Eshelman (1971) examined the allocation of medical research funds using a 
different approach, which was a variation of the public interest method used by 
Weisbrod. He criticized Weisbrod’s ideas of deducting consumption from earnings to 
measure the cost of premature death and of using death rates as an allocation 
mechanism. Ehselman used gross earnings and advocated developing marginal rates 
of return for research on individual disease categories. He tried to estimate directly 
the rates of return for medical research on infectious and parasitic diseases and cancer, 
in order to compare the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of research on those 
diseases. He argued that the greatest benefit to society would be achieved not by 
allocating research funds based on deaths, but by allocating the most funds to those 
diseases with the most productive research. In doing so, he made some restrictive 
assumptions: he excluded environmental factors such as sanitation and hygiene from 
the benefits of medical research, as well as lifestyle factors such as diet, exercise or 
tobacco use. These omissions certainly understated the value of medical research, as 
medical research led to many of the changes in sanitation, hygiene, and lifestyle. Also, 
his data set has serious problems: when estimating the equation for the rate of return 
to cancer research, he used only data from the state of Connecticut on five-year
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survival rates, and only data from California for six to fifteen-year survival rates. 
Because of his restrictive assumptions and spotty data, his research is of limited 
usefulness. However, even with these problems, he still found that the marginal 
benefits from medical research far exceeded the marginal costs.
Selma Mushkin’s extensive work on Biomedical research funding (1979) 
highlights many of the problems associated with developing a resource allocation 
model for biomedical research expenditures. She operates under a standard public- 
interest, welfare-maximizing model. Mushkin’s analysis is limited by her data set; she 
had access only to expenditures by institute level. The overlapping nature of the 
research done by the institutes -  research on leukemia and lung cancer is carried out 
by both the National Cancer Institute and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood 
Institute, for example -  makes institute-level data unreliable. Using this data, 
however, Mushkin found only a basic correlation between institute funding and death 
rates. No other measure of illness impact provided any explanation of funding levels. 
In addition, Mushkin did not attempt to incorporate any other explanatory variables 
into her equations. The fact that death rates for various diseases remained essentially 
stable for long periods of time also tainted her results. Mushkin does sketch an 
interesting experimental resource allocation model for use by the N.I.H. in allocating 
funding among diseases. She suggests that special interest groups, such as the March 
of Dimes or the American Cancer Society, should be allowed to bid for increases in 
research funding for various diseases by making contributions to the N.I.H.. 
Mushkin's main contribution is in her detailed effort to examine the N.I.H. and
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government medical research as a unified program. She also highlighted the real 
shortcomings of the government's collection of information on research funding.
Garber and Romer (1993) examined the costs and benefits of medial research 
to American society as a whole in “Evaluating the Federal Role in Financing Health- 
Related Research”. They assume that a public interest paradigm dominates the 
decision-making process in government medical research funding. The two methods 
available for financing the costs of research are expanded property rights (monopoly 
power) and tax-financed subsidies. Policy makers must address two questions: Is the 
total level of support research adequate? Is the balance between subsidies and 
monopoly power appropriate? In order to do this, they must have quantitative 
information about the costs and benefits of medical research. This is difficult to 
obtain. If profits (of pharmaceutical firms, for example) are used as a measure of 
benefits, they underestimate benefits because they omit the consumer surplus. The 
over-consumption of medical goods and services caused by insurance also creates a 
distortion in estimating the true benefits to society.
Garber and Romer theorize that the highest payoff to government spending on 
medical research may come from funding research in areas where it is prohibitively 
expensive to establish the system of property rights that makes private profits possible. 
They use as an example the discovery by government researchers that aspirin can 
prevent heart attacks. Because of the large number of firms producing aspirin, no one 
firm would underwrite this research, because the profit increase from additional 
aspirin consumption was shared among all the aspirin firms. In this case, government 
research clearly increased consumer surplus. In another example, however, N.I.H.
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sponsored research led to the development of the drug alglucerase for the treatment of 
Gaucher disease. Subsequently the N.I.H. gave the monopoly rights for this drug to a 
private firm, under the provisions of the Orphan Drug Act, in order to get the drug 
produced. However, the price of drug therapy is over $300,000 per year, and victims 
must take the drug for life. Because there is no substitute for the drug, the monopoly 
producer can charge any price and insurers will pay. Here, profits clearly exceed the 
benefit to society. Garber and Romer assert that the present paucity of information on 
measurable benefits and costs of research makes it extremely difficult to answer the 
critical policy questions facing the federal government and American society. They 
call for extensive collection of new types of data and limited social experiments to 
facilitate informed decision making. They do not attempt to provide evidence that the 
federal government is actually operating under a public interest model, or any other 
model, for that matter.
In a departure from the prevailing public interest approaches to modeling 
research funding, Ince (198S) undertakes an examination of medical research policy in 
Australia in an effort to determine if special interest groups played a role in the 
awarding of research grants by the Australian National Health and Medical Research 
Council. Her database consists of approved applications received between 1966-1981, 
and rejected applications by people who had at least one other application approved 
during that period. Consequently, her data on non-funded applications is skewed and 
contains an unknown portion of the total pool of non-funded applications. Thus it is 
impossible, for example, to tell which areas of research are being discouraged, or to 
make any judgments about geographic discrimination.
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Ince recognizes the importance of classifying research by disease category if 
useful conclusions are to be drawn from the analysis, so she assigns each application 
to a particular disease based on which journals the publications resulting from the 
research were published in. In this way she gets an admittedly crude estimate of the 
dollars being spent on research on each disease, because the journals are classified 
under one disease only, but often contain articles on several diseases. Of course, the 
articles being published may not be in the journal which best corresponds to the 
disease classification of the research. Ince does a basic analysis of the data to see 
which, if any, of several organizational and process models drive the allocation of 
research funding and the awarding of grants. Her results are mixed. Only a weak 
correlation between peer-review scientific merit scores and the dollar amount of a 
funded grant is revealed. She tests an interest group model, but does not find any 
evidence to support it. Finally, she does not find any correlation between disease 
funding levels and any burden of illness measure (death, hospital stays, office visits, 
etc.). Ince's efforts represent the first attempt to actually measure the impact of special 
interest groups on research allocation. Her lack of concrete results, supporting either 
special interest group or public interest theory most likely stem from her limited data 
and methodological problems.
2J  N.I.H. Funding
Lichtenberg, in “The Allocation of Publicly-Funded Biomedical Research” 
(199S) undertook one of the few studies which is an examination of the allocation of 
research at the N.I.H. His is a classic social-welfare model of resource allocation. He 
developed a theoretical model for efficient allocation of research funds, in which
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research for all diseases is assumed to produce equal returns, the probability of finding 
a cure depends directly on research funding, and the budget for research is fixed. This 
becomes a constrained optimization problem, in which the goal is to cure the most 
people (maximize the public welfare). Research funding should increase with the 
incidence of the disease. He estimates a simple model using data on government 
funding of research taken from the CRISP (Computerized Retrieval of Information on 
Scientific Projects) database. This database contains information on research grants 
awarded by the federal government, primarily the N.I.H.. Many grants are not 
disease-specific, and are not included. Using data on grants made in 1995 and 
classified as research on a particular disease, he constructs an estimate of the 1995 
spending by the government in individual disease research.
Lichtenberg first estimates a regression using the potential years of life lost to 
various disease categories in 1980 as an explanatory variable for government research 
funding on each category in 1982. The source of this data is not clear. With a sample 
size of 14, it is difficult to make accurate judgments. Also, the estimation method he 
uses to isolate the impact of life years lost to whites and non-whites on federal 
research spending creates a collinearity problem which is not addressed. In addition, 
he uses statistically insignificant coefficients to draw conclusions.
Next Lichtenberg estimates the relationship between persons living with 
chronic conditions in 1990-1992 (using the National Health Information Survey) and 
the CRISP data on 1995 research funding. However, he uses the number of grants 
which mention a disease in the subject as the measure of research funding, not the 
dollar amount of the funding awarded. Also, grants can be counted toward more than
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one disease. Although his sample size is fifty-four chronic conditions, the nature of 
the classification of condition in the NH1S makes it difficult to precisely correlate 
them with the disease categories used by the N.I.H. In summary, although 
Lichtenberg sets up a useful framework for further study of the subject, his data is not 
substantial enough to support any real conclusions about the allocation of research 
funding by the N.I.H.
A second economic analysis of the allocation process at the N.I.H. under the 
public interest theory has been done by Gross, Anderson, and Powe (1999). They 
used a cross section of twenty-nine diseases, including such items as injuries, alcohol 
abuse, depression, and dental disorders. They compared funding by the N.I.H. in 1996 
for each of these items with various measures of the burden of disease, such as total 
mortality, hospital days, and years of life lost to each disease. They made extensive 
use of the Global Burden of Disease Study by the World Health Organization.
This study divided the countries of the world into eight regions, with the 
United States classified in the Established Market Economies region. Its goal was to 
develop estimates of the incidence, prevalence, and mortality of various diseases 
around the globe in 1990 for use in determining policies and programs for the WHO. 
It also developed a new measure of the burden of disease called Disability Adjusted 
Life Years (DALYs). A DALY is defined as one year of healthy life lost due to 
disability or death from each disease. Gross et al used these 1990 incidence and 
prevalence rates for the EME region as explanatory variables in their study. They had 
no predictive power. However, they focused on the DALY as an explanatory variable, 
showing that it was positive and highly significant in explaining N.I.H. funding. Their
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conclusion was that it was an excellent measure of the burden of disease, and that the 
N.I.H. was indeed allocating funds appropriately.
There have been numerous criticisms of the DALY, namely that it explicitly 
states that life is less valuable for disabled people than healthy people.2 It includes a 
rubric which forces respondents to discount the lives of disabled people; weighting 
the value of a year of life to a deaf person as equal to a year of life for a hearing person 
is not permitted. In addition, the DALY computation is heavily weighted toward 
people between the ages of eighteen and forty-eight. Years of life to children and 
older people are weighted less than those for young-to-middle-aged adults. In 
addition, future years of life are weighted less than the current year. These 
computational mechanisms give a result that is not necessarily in accordance with the 
ideas of equity among the American population. If weights are determined by age, 
why not sex, income, or race? The fact that DALYs are correlated well with N.I.H. 
funding across diseases in 1996 is not reassuring to the parents of young children or to 
senior citizens. Gross et al completed the first truly rigorous analysis of the social 
welfare implication of research allocation at the National Institutes of Health. Their 
major problems are the sample size and the reliance on the DALY.
In contrast with Lichtenberg and Gross, several studies analyzing the N.I.H. 
have tired to determine the role that special interest groups play in the decision­
making processes of the N.I.H. Carter (1974) analyzed the awarding of N.I.H. grants 
to medical schools during the years 1968-1973. She worked on a project undertaken 
by the Rand Institute for the N.I.H. in response to a critical report by the OMB, raising
2 Trude Amesen and Erik Nord, “The Value of DALY Life: Problems with Ethics and Validity of 
Disability Adjusted Life Years,” British Medical Journal 319, no. 7222 (1999): 142S.
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allegations of conflict of interest in the peer review process, over-concentration of 
funds among a few school, and the existence of an "old boys network" at the N.I.H. 
She found that the applications funded were those with the highest quality, although 
she did not explain the strong correlation between the probability of funding and 
previous approval. Carter did not test for the influence of political and special interest 
groups.
Ginzberg and Dutka (1989) provide substantial evidence of geographic 
distortion in the awarding of research grants by the N.I.H., but do not provide any real 
explanation for it. They also note the persistent decline in the percent of eligible 
projects funded after 1975. Their chapter on the allocation of research funding 
resources among diseases essentially concludes that this topic is problematic and, 
therefore, usually not addressed.
Another study in the special interest group framework is that done by Janet M. 
Cuca. In "Scientific, Social, and Other Factors in the Evaluation of Applications for 
N.I.H. Research Grants" (1990), she found that non-scientific factors contributed 
substantially to the probability of receiving grant funds. She also found that study 
section members are, in fact, "interested parties," and that some applications are likely 
to be "favored." She also noted the latitude in interpreting such abstract terms used in 
the scoring criteria as "significance" and "originality." Her data set was the most 
comprehensive ever used in a study of the N.I.H.: approximately 2,000 applications 
for research funds for fiscal year 1982. Because she actually had data for both funded 
and unfunded grants, her data is not subject to the selectivity bias present in other 
work. Dr. Cuca was an employee of the N.I.H. who used data not available to the
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public for her research. Again, her research supports the contention that forces exist 
which affect the awarding of research grants that have nothing to do with maximizing 
social welfare.
Kiken (1993) pursues a different approach and investigates the roles of various 
interest groups in the funding process at the N.I.H.. This is helpful in that political 
forces are acknowledged to be a powerful determinant on both the levels of funding 
for various institutes and which diseases are pursued. She identifies several logical 
special interest groups -  the Administration, Congress, the N.I.H. bureaucracy, the 
media, doctors/the AMA -  but is unable to provide any substantive evidence of their 
effectiveness in shifting research priorities. Her evidence is almost entirely anecdotal. 
She gets a number of anonymous employees of the N.I.H. to confirm that special 
interest groups do play a role in the decision-making process, but she has no hard data 
to back up these assertions.
Brooks (1994) has a more thorough analysis of the role of special interest 
groups in medical research funding. She provides some data to demonstrate that 
interest groups have created shifts in research priorities by the N.I.H.. Her data set is, 
like Mushkin’s, institute-level budgetary data, and consequently of limited usefulness. 
A contribution of her work is a survey of executives at the N.I.H., who tend to either 
deny that politics and interest groups have any influence on funding at all, or to blame 
any irregularities on Congress. One interesting result revealed by the survey was that 
agency executives were opposed to any coordinated plan of spending and research for 
the N.I.H. as a whole, such as one based on the burden of disease. Brooks' perception 
was that such a plan would threaten the power of the bureaucracy at the N.I.H..
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An extensive article by Baird (1999) examines the policies of the N.I.H. and 
the Food and Drug Administration with respect to the inclusion of women and 
minorities in clinical trials and research studies. Women were routinely excluded 
from clinical trials after the diethylstilbestrol (DES) and thalidomide problems that 
surfaced in the 1950’s. However, one side effect of the ban on using women of 
childbearing years in clinical studies was the inability to study therapies and 
treatments designed just for female diseases. Partly as a result of the women’s rights 
movement of the 1970’s,the N.I.H. established its Advisory Committee on Women’s 
Health Issues in 1986. This committee was essentially ignored. The turning point for 
women’s issues came in 1990, when the General Accounting Office prepared to 
present a report to Congress on the treatment of women in clinical trials and research 
studies by government funded researchers. Congresswomen Schroeder, Oakar, and 
Lloyd, along with Senator Snowe, generated widespread publicity for the presentation 
of the report. Other members of the Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues took 
up the cause, and in 1990 the Office of Research on Women’s Health (ORWH) was 
established in the N.I.H. to ensure the participation of women in the research process 
and to address women’s health issues. In 1991 the Women’s Health Initiative at 
N.I.H. was begun, which was a massive study of 150,000 women designed to last until 
2005. Another result of the ORWH was a sharp increase in the allocation of funds to 
breast cancer, ovarian and reproductive system cancers, and osteoporosis research by 
the N.I.H. The 1993 N.I.H. Reauthorization Act prohibited researchers from 
excluding women or minorities from studies and clinical trials. Baird's examination
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demonstrates a that coalition of special interest groups which achieve political power 
can reap an increase in targeted research funds.
A study of the distribution of N.I.H. research awards among medical schools 
(Moy, et al., 2000) highlighted the consistency of awards to the same ten schools over 
the period 1986-1997. Each of these school represents a small special interest group. 
Increases in research funding to these schools result in increases in size and prestige, 
and provide a valuable recruiting tool. The ten schools which received the most 
funding comprise only eight percent of the nation’s medical schools, yet they 
consistently garnered about twenty-five percent of the research money awarded. In 
contrast, the seventy-five schools getting the least money comprised sixty percent of 
the medical schools, but only received less than twenty-five percent of the money 
awarded. The study makes no attempt to explain the distribution data, other than to 
note that awards to principal researchers with an M.D. increased more than the 
proportion awarded to researchers with a Ph.D. over the period. The mean value of 
awards to the top ten schools remained relatively constant at $197,000 (1986 dollars), 
while the amount awarded to the remainder rose, though it remained substantially 
below the amount awarded to top school researchers. The authors of the study noted 
that the N.I.H. may influence the proportion of medical schools that conduct research. 
Large increases in future N.I.H. budgets should serve to reduce concentration among 
the top medical schools, while small increases in research budget may tend to increase 
concentration. However, a review of the data reveals that the N.I.H. budget increased 
by over one-third in real dollars from 1986-1997, during which time the concentration 
of research awards among medical schools actually increased, rather than decreased.
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This lack of variation in the awards given to the top ten schools over an extended 
period of time may be evidence of special interest groups at work; conversely, it may 
be an indication of the quality of the schools.
Along with the role of special interest groups, the impact of political factors 
must be considered when examining the N.I.H. Both Congress and the Executive 
Branch influence the funding decisions of the N.I.H. Roessner (1970) examined the 
role of the House of Representatives in controlling and shaping the National Institutes 
of Health during the years 1959-1964. His emphasis was on explaining the part that 
House committees played in directing the funding and activities of the N.I.H.. His 
findings in some respects were similar to those of Wildavsky (1964): the true control 
over the N.I.H. in Congress takes place at the committee lever, rather than on the 
House floor, and Congress relied heavily on the expertise of agency personnel in 
making decisions affecting the N.I.H..
Weston (1994) examined the determinants of congressional appropriations for 
the N.I.H.. He used data on total funding for nine institutes over the years 1977-1993, 
so his data set did not accurately permit identification of research funding to various 
diseases. His analysis supported the incremental budgeting model formulated by 
Wildavsky, as current changes in an institute's budget were highly dependent on past 
changes. Weston also examined interference in the N.I.H. institute appropriations 
process during the year 1992 by members of the Senate Appropriations Committee. 
He found that Republicans and Democrats were equally likely to participate in the 
process, and that senators up for re-election participated more than those who weren't. 
The N.I.H. is popular with the voting public.
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Weston assigned each institute a primary disease focus, and then computed a 
cause of death ratio for each institute, which was the number of deaths from that 
disease divided by total deaths for the year. He found a significant negative 
correlation between the cause of death ratio and funding for that Institute, which he 
could not explain. He also found that over the years 1977-1993, N.I.H. appropriations 
did not keep pace with inflation. Additional findings were that Democratic control of 
Congress increased N.I.H. funding, as did an election year. Members of Congress can 
improve their chances for re-election by responding to pressures from constituents. 
Weston's research supports both special interest group theory and the importance of 
politics in funding decisions.
Former N.I.H. Director Bemadine Healy complained that the “ability of the 
N.I.H. to fulfill its mission has been eroded by relentless partisan politics.” (Healy, 
1994) One problem is that the N.I.H. is classified under “Health and Welfare” in the 
Office of Management and Budget, not under “Science,” as are N.A.S.A. and N.S.F.. 
Because the N.I.H. is a part of the Department of Health and Human Services, its 
budget can be tapped for uses in the Public Health Service or by the DHHS Secretary. 
In addition, the N.I.H. budget is appropriated piecemeal by Congress, as each institute 
has a separately submitted and approved budget. Therefore, the opportunities for 
meddling by Congress are many. Any scientific judgment that necessitates 
reallocating more than one percent of an institute’s budget requires an Act of 
Congress. These institutional factors reduce N.I.H. cohesiveness and impede 
scientific progress. Also, Congress passes from time to time “reauthorization bills” 
for the N.I.H. which create legally binding directives about spending, but do not
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appropriate any money for these activities. The number of specific congressional 
directives about N.I.H. expenditures increased from 122 in 1984 to 260 in 1991. 
Healy cites this statistic as evidence of the growing interference of Congress, which 
makes it difficult for the N.I.H. to do its job. Although biomedical research is popular 
with both Congress and the public, Healy asserts that the N.I.H. is not itself a 
politically powerful agency, lacking the “political clout needed to confront 
inappropriate political pressures.” She advocates independent agency status for the 
N.I.H., similar to that of the N.S.F. and N.A.S.A. Healy, who had a long and close 
relationship with the N.I.H., is a convincing authority when arguing that political 
factors play a major role in the decisions made at the N.I.H..
Congress itself recognized the need to examine the decision-making process at 
the National Institutes of Health in 1996, and mandated a study of the agency by the 
Institute of Medicine. The results, published as Scientific Opportunities and Public 
Needs in 1998, identified some definite problems with the agency's funding 
determination process. The committee examined the funding allocation criteria of the 
N.I.H., and found them vague and lacking in quality information. In particular, the 
committee criticized the poor data collected on research funding by disease, the 
absence of reliance on quantifiable measures of burden of disease, and the lack of 
high-quality data on the burden of disease. They recommended that the N.I.H. should 
gather better data on funding by the disease, the various burden of disease measures, 
and the costs of disease. The N.I.H. should then use this data to help allocate funding, 
and should conduct public evaluations of the impact of their research funding on the
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burdens of disease. The Institute of Medicine report found substantial evidence that 
the N.I.H. did not operate under a true public interest theory of resource allocation.
The committee noted that the N.I.H. followed a decentralized model of 
decision making, with each institute making its own decisions about which projects to 
fund. The report complained of the lack of an overall research plan to coordinate 
research across centers. This, they felt, contributed to the tendency of Congress and 
the President to intervene in the process and set aside funding for the projects 
demanded by noisy voters. The Institute of Medicine suggested that an clear, overall 
strategic plan should be developed and updated regularly, and that this would reduce 
congressional interference.
Another area in which the N.I.H. was not performing well was interaction with 
the public. The general public, patient advocacy groups and special populations had 
no clear means of input into the decision-making process. The N.I.H. was frequently 
described as unresponsive to these groups. This, in turn, increased petitions to 
Congress for special intervention into N.I.H. funding decisions. The committee 
recommended that the N.I.H. establish an Office of Public Liaison in the Office of the 
Director, and in each institute, to formally seek out and collect public input. The 
N.I.H. has done this, which should improve its ability to perform as a welfare- 
maximizing agency.
2.4 Other Federal Agency Funding Studies
Another pioneer in modeling federal agency budgeting was William Niskanen. 
Bureaucracy and Representative Government, published in 1971, develops a model of 
bureaucratic utility. He defines the relationship between government agencies and the
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federal government as that of a bilateral monopoly. Niskanen argues that bureaucrats 
act to maximize their budget, which leads to a result that federal government output 
will be larger than optimal, but will be produced at the minimum cost. He formalizes 
the role of the elected legislature, based on the concept that legislators determine the 
demand for various government services provided by government agencies, and then 
monitor the behavior of the agencies.
The role of congressional committees is key, as it is in Wildavskys 
framework. Niskanen theorizes that the committee members generally receive the 
committee assignments they request; consequently, the demand for services by 
committee members will be higher than that of the median legislator. Because the 
decisions of the committees are rarely overturned, this results in output that is higher 
by each government agency than a randomly selected committee would approve. In 
addition, because legislators have limited time, they will choose to spend very little 
time monitoring bureaus, which would generate cost savings for all citizens; instead, 
they devote their time to activities which affect their own constituencies and help them 
to get re-elected. This results in too little monitoring. Niskanen thus argues that the 
resulting budgets for federal agencies in general will exceed the social welfare ideal. 
The theories of both Niskanen and Wildavsky are applicable to the N.I.H., and are 
useful in explaining its behavior.
An interesting examination of a federal agency similar to the N.I.H. was 
undertaken by Howard Wachtel in “How the N.S.F. Funds Research in Economics’* 
(2000). Wachtel studied the peer review process at the National Science Foundation 
during the years 1974-1995. During this period, the N.S.F. awarded over $200 million
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in economics research grants to universities, of which $133 million went to fifteen 
schools. Wachtel argues that the stable “market share” maintained by these schools 
over twenty years would be used in any other industry as evidence of a cartel. In 
contrast, the awards received by the remaining schools fluctuated widely from year to 
year. In any given year, the top fifteen schools received about two-thirds of the 
awards, and forty or more schools competed for the remaining one-third of available 
money. Wachtel theorized that the composition of the peer review panels might have 
some bearing on the award pattern he observed. Although the N.S.F. was 
uncooperative in his requests for information on peer review panels, he managed to 
finally obtain the data from the Library of Congress. He found a “remarkable 
congruence” between the proportion of panel members from the top fifteen schools 
(sixty-eight percent) and the percentage of grant money awarded to those schools (also 
sixty-eight percent) over sixteen years. He calls for a broadening of the awards 
process to include more schools, and more access to the peer-review system. 
Although his research raises interesting possibilities for examining N.I.H. research 
awards, the concentration of awards among relatively few schools may simply be a 
reflection of the quality of the research work done at those schools.
2.5 Conclusions
Although there has been some work done on the positive rate of return from 
biomedical research ( Eshelman, 1971; Mushkin, 1979; Weisbrod, 1967), there has 
been surprisingly little research done in the area of optimal allocation of a given level 
of funding among the various diseases. This study will be an advance over previous 
studies in this area because it will examine funding by actual diseases, rather than
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institutes; I will compile a data set not previously used in this context. I will also 
attempt to quantify the effects of special interest groups and political factors on the 
allocation process, which has not been done before. Finally, 1 also hope to examine 
the distribution of funding by geographic region in relation to various political factors.
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CHAPTER 3 
TIME SERIES DATA AND REGRESSIONS
3.1 Research Funding Data
The National Institutes of Health collected data on the amount of research 
funding which they devoted to various diseases only on a limited basis prior to the 
mid-1990's. Information on research funding by disease was obtained from the N.I.H. 
web page (http://www.N.I.H.gov) and from correspondence with N.I.H. employees. 
Examination of allocation patterns by the N.I.H. from 1987-2001 is restricted to those 
diseases on which they kept statistics.
The data set contains twenty-one diseases: Alzheimer's disease, asthma, breast 
cancer, cancer (all types), chronic fatigue syndrome, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, Epstein- 
Barr virus, HIV/Aids, hypertension, kidney disease, lupus, osteoporosis, Parkinson's 
disease, prostate cancer, sexually transmitted diseases, sickle cell disease, spinal cord 
injury, stroke, sudden infant death syndrome, and tuberculosis. The information on 
funding was obtained from the Office of Financial Management at the National 
Institutes of Health. The choice of diseases depended entirely on what funding 
statistics the N.I.H. was able to provide. Surprisingly, they did not collect information 
on the amount of research funding they provided for many diseases during this period, 
including such major killer diseases as heart disease, pneumonia, and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease. All three of these diseases ranked in the top ten causes 
of death for each of the fifteen years being studied. Funding information was 
collected, however, for a number of less deadly diseases such as Epstein-Barr, chronic 
fatigue syndrome, lupus, and sexually transmitted diseases.
38
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Table 3.1 compares total N.I.H. funding to the amount of funding for the 
diseases considered in this study. Funding for these diseases comprises from 42 to 49 
percent of the total N.I.H. budget during these years. The remainder of the N.I.H. 
budget was not categorized by disease.
Both the total N.I.H. budget and the amount of funding for these twenty-one 
diseases increased every year during the period 1987-2001. This is true even when the 
amounts are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (1984 = 100). 
Figure 3.1 plots the total budget for the N.I.H. in constant dollars. The amounts are 
converted to logarithmic form to compress the scale into a more manageable picture. 
The slope of the curve is always upward-sloping, but clearly, the slope is not constant. 
The rate of increase in the budget amounts was less during the period 1993 to 1998 
than during the years 1987-1992. The rate of change increased again in 1999, 
probably as a result of the congressional mandate to double the N.I.H. budget by the 
year 2003.
3.2 Death Data
The attribution of deaths to various causes in the United States is carried out by 
attending physicians' coding of death certificates. These deaths certificates are used 
by the Centers for Disease Control to compile national death statistics. This 
compilation process takes about two years. Death data were obtained from the CDC 
web page (http://www.cdc.gov) using their Wonder database search engine. The death 
statistics for this study use the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth 
Revision, for cause of death coding. Table 3.2 lists total deaths for each year 1984 - 
1998, the latest year for which death statistics are available. Also shown is the number
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Table 3.1 
Research Funding Data 






1987 $6,180,660 $2,736,126 0.4427
1988 7,186,959 3,085,420 0.4293
1989 7,893,586 3,494,642 0.4427
1990 8,505,256 3,892,914 0.4577
1991 9,217,940 4,277,995 0.4641
1992 10,010,368 4,728,995 0.4724
1993 10,328,117 4,934,196 0.4777
1994 10,910,969 5,347,668 0.4901
1995 11,340,841 5,509,311 0.4858
1996 11,880,847 5,771,061 0.4857
1997 12,770,771 6,112,058 0.4786
1998 13,622,386 6,389,125 0.4690
1999 15,597,189 7,575,300 0.4857
2000 17,793,587 8,591,300 0.4828
2001 20,300,000 9,069,100 0.4468
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Year
Figure 3.1: Total N.I.H. Funding Over Time (1984 Dollars)
Source: Office of Communications and Public Liaison, N.L H. Almanac, 1999.









1984 2,039,369 701,779 0.3441
1985 2,086,440 716,705 0.3435
1986 2,105,361 728,318 0.3459
1987 2,123,323 743,422 0.3501
1988 2,167,999 759,810 0.3505
1989 2,150,466 779,183 0.3623
1990 2,148,463 791,318 0.3683
1991 2,169,518 807,541 0.3768
1992 2,175,613 820,906 0.3773
1993 2,268,553 850,276 0.3748
1994 2,278,994 868,077 0.3809
1995 2,312,132 884,927 0.3827
1996 2,314,690 881,585 0.3809
1997 2,314,245 871,353 0.3765
1998 2,337,258 874,589 0.3742
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics, Annual.
of deaths each year attributed to the twenty-one diseases in this data set. The 
percentage of total deaths examined in this study varies from about thirty-four to 
thirty-eight percent. The top ten causes of death for each of the years 1984-1998 are 
listed in Appendix A.
3.3 Patterns of Spending per Death
It is interesting to examine the pattern of funding by disease. Clearly, deaths 
from a particular disease are one of the most relevant measures of the burden of that 
disease to our society. If the N.I.H. is using deaths as a measure of the burden of 
disease, and is using this information to determine what diseases deserve the most 
research funding, we should see a strong correlation between the number of people 
who die from a disease and the funding devoted to that disease. Also, if the N.I.H. 
considers all deaths as equally catastrophic, then deaths from one disease should 
weigh no more heavily than deaths from any other disease.
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Figure 3.2 shows the funding per death by disease category for the year 1994, 
the mid-point of this study. The amount of research funding the N.I.H. devoted to a 
disease is divided by the number of people who died from that disease. The resulting 
dollar amount per death is converted to logarithmic form in order to fit all of the 
diseases on one page. The graph is a scatter diagram, revealing that funding per death 
varies widely depending on the cause of death. The highest level is for chronic fatigue 
syndrome, which kills very few people. The lowest level is for stroke, which is the 
third largest cause of deaths. A similar irregular pattern is present for each of the 
fifteen years of the study (1987-2001). If funding per death were equal across all 
diseases, the graph would be a horizontal line. All deaths are not equal in the eyes of 
the N.I.H.. What accounts for these disparities?
Figure 3.2 Log of Research Funding Per Death 1994. Source: 
Office of Financial Management, Funding by Selected Categories.
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A closer examination of the levels of funding awarded to research on the 
various diseases reveals some striking differences. Table 3.3 lists the amount of 
funding per death from each disease for each year 1987 - 2001. Those diseases which 
caused the deaths of fewer than 1,000 persons per year during each year are marked 
with an asterisk.
Those diseases which kill very few people, such as Epstein-Barr virus, chronic 
fatigue syndrome, osteoporosis and sexually transmitted diseases have research 
funding amounts that frequently exceed $1 million per death. Clearly, the number of 
deaths does not motivate research in these areas.
Among the ten leading causes of death each year, cancer (second), stroke 
(third) and diabetes (seventh) are included in this portion of the study. Cancer and 
diabetes receive far more funding proportionally than does stroke. Even though the 
amount funded per diabetes death actually decreased slightly during some years, and 
increased only by thirty-two percent over the entire fifteen year period, the level of 
funding for diabetes deaths was always at least five times higher than research funding 
per stroke death. In some years, diabetes funding per death was seventeen times 
higher than that for stroke.
Funding per diabetes death also exceeded that for cancer during each of the 
years studied, despite the fact that cancer killed over 500,000 people per year, and 
diabetes fewer than 65,000 per year. In fact, the amount of per death funding for 
diabetes was greater than the amount devoted to both cancer and stroke combined for 
ten of the fifteen years. Stroke research is underfunded relative to both cancer and


















NIH Research Funding per Death 
1987-1993 (1984 Dollars)
Disease 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Alzheimer’s 12,135 10,232 13,491 12,914 18,712 21,271 20,899
Asthma 6,762 6,005 5,992 6,468 8,527 8,585 13,136
Breast Cancer 1,640 1,890 1,972 2,121 2,363 3,597 5,244
All Cancer 3,490 3,583 3,800 3,864 3,995 4,364 4,404
Chronic Fatigue* 111,714 197,600 736,000 479,250 2,822,000 1,557,500 678,250
Cystic Fibrosis* 55,194 72,722 91,324 102,663 131,846 124,049 152,848
Diabetes 6,550 6,526 6,943 6,469 6,478 5,945 5,993
Epstein Barr* 901,533 826,875 1,148,429 963,786 1,073,733 874,050 1,339,769
HIV/Aids 81,635 75,823 59,047 67,171 60,535 47,560 42,660
Hpertension 15,995 14,956 15,404 15,485 16,135 17,305 18,651
Kidney 4,263 5,319 5,467 5,615 5,875 6,996 7,332
Lupus 18,547 19,580 20,845 19,526 19,127 18,235 21,877
Osteoporosis* 64,716 63,565 82,945 108,552 119,357 128,261 126,001
Parkinson’s 7,089 7,817 8,001 7,843 7,154 9,337 9,918
Prostate Cancer 518 498 580 662 661 1,313 1,925
STD’s* 417,589 601,722 606,980 619,135 744,317 670,455 714,975
Sickle Cell* 98,791 82,940 86,677 91,331 122,193 102,394 100,989
Spinal Cord 7,181 8,067 7,946 8,266 8,837 9,290 9,689
Stroke 367 372 470 522 604 751 778
SIDS 5,369 6,209 7,454 6,877 7,939 7,560 8,372
Tuberculosis 887 925 1,661 1,921 2,564 7,771 19,329
Source: Office of Financial Management, Funding by Selected Categories. Centers for Disease Control, WONDER Mortality 



















Disease 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Alzheimer’s 20,982 20,557 18,169 17,354 16,034 18,998 20,752 21,606
Asthma 12,926 13,739 15,793 16,858 17,900 24,775 29,076 30,765
Breast Cancer 6,981 8,392 10,948 11,616 11,932 13,380 14,372 13,140
All Cancer 4,558 4,676 4,851 5,077 5,164 6,260 7,148 7,528
Chronic Fatigue* 5,426,000 7,765,000 787,222 1,987,500 1,300,000 1,675,000 857,143 1,575,000
Cystic Fibrosis* 142,170 147,720 158,346 149,002 143,919 166,512 172,863 189,579
Diabetes 5,998 5,895 5,547 5,579 5,446 7,409 8,384 8,664
Epstein Barr* 1,333,071 924,211 1,162,667 1,057,619 1,104,348 1,693,750 1,629,412 1,333,333
HIV/Aids 43,967 39,740 37,870 35,648 37,182 57,600 121,514 157,282
Hpertension 18,186 16,595 15,514 15,656 13,869 13,550 14,498 14,426
Kidney 7,248 6,991 6,593 7,110 7,223 8,105 8,725 8,862
Lupus 24,652 25,010 25,681 26,203 26,847 32,835 36,592 37,097
Osteoporosis 122,553 131,548 116,542 110,616 120,236 116,638 124,595 121,147
Parkinson’s 9,323 9,387 8,472 8,179 10,139 11,169 12,798 12,562
Prostate Cancer 2,062 2,496 2,658 2,756 3,295 5,202 7,273 8,422
STD’s* 900,385 1,001,745 1,057,557 1,024,913 1,559,494 1,350,495 1,961,538 2,545,313
Sickle Cell 120,410 102,758 96,369 96,863 91,525 99,408 118,239 115,922
Spinal Cord 9,187 8,924 10,858 11,220 10,253 10,668 11,654 11,384
Stroke 822 835 839 871 1,041 1,215 1,351 1,419
SIDS 8,487 8,945 9,828 11,985 13,335 16,164 18,756 20,907
Tuberculosis 29,297 36,352 39,340 45,552 49,513 60,566 70,069 78,058
Source: Office of Financial Management, Funding by Selected Categories. 
Database, "‘caused the deaths of less than 1,000 people per year.
Centers for Disease Control, WONDER Mortality
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diabetes, and cancer is also underfunded compared to diabetes, based on the number of 
deaths from each disease.
Another interesting comparison involves funding for breast cancer and that of 
prostate cancer. Breast cancer is almost entirely a disease confined to women, and 
prostate cancer occurs only in men. Funding per breast cancer death increased 700 
percent, from $1,640 per death in 1987 to $13,140 per death in 2001. Prostate cancer, 
on the other hand, went from $518 per death in 1987 to $8,422 in 2001, an increase of 
1500 percent. Currently, breast cancer kills about 10,000 more people per year than 
prostate cancer. Is this the reason that breast cancer research receives more funding? 
If so, why was the increase in prostate cancer funding almost double that of breast 
cancer? In addition, cancers that are more deadly than either breast or prostate cancer, 
such as lung cancer and colorectal cancer, receive less funding per death than either 
breast cancer or prostate cancer. Why are deaths from different cancers treated 
differently?
The most spectacular increase in research funding per death during the years 
1987 - 2001 was for tuberculosis. Funding per death was only $887 in 1987, and it 
rose to $78,058 per death by 2001, and increase of 8,700 percent. No other disease 
received increases of such magnitude, despite that fact that deaths from tuberculosis 
remained relatively constant between 1000 and 2000 people per year for the entire 
period, and there was no upward trend. Clearly, another factor besides deaths from the 
disease must be causing this increase. Is it that tuberculosis is contagious?
What conclusions can be drawn from the information in Table 3.3? The N.I.H. 
is not awarding research funding dollars to a disease solely on the basis of the number
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of people who die from that disease. If this were the case, diseases such as chronic 
fatigue syndrome would not be receiving research funding at all. In addition, the 
N.I.H. must not perceive all deaths to be equally adverse outcomes, for the deviation 
in funding per death is substantial, even among those disease that kill large numbers of 
people each year.
3.4 Patterns of Spending by Disease
In order to help us better understand the allocation process of the N.I.H., it is 
useful to study both the level and rate of increase in the funding for research on each 
of the twent-one diseases under consideration during the years 1987-2001. The next 
group of graphs, Figures 3.3 -  3.24, show the log of constant dollar funding for each 
disease from 1987-2001. Although all diseases posted a real increase over the course 
of the period, the slopes vary tremendously. Only Aids, breast cancer, and prostate 
cancer had persistent increases. As mentioned earlier, tuberculosis had the largest 
real increase over the period, but even so, there were several years of flat growth. 
Most diseases had some periods of flat budgets, and many had years of real decreases. 
Again, all diseases are not treated equally by the N.I.H.
At least part of the explanation for the variation in funding stems from the fact 
that the N.I.H. relied heavily on investigator proposals during the period being studied. 
The N.I.H. admittedly did not have funding goals for many diseases during this time. 
They were under not any constraint to spend a particular amount on research for any 
disease, unless Congress specifically decreed that they do so. Congressional input will 
be addressed in a later section.
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Figure 3.3: Alzheimer's Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
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Figure 3.4: Asthma Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: N.I.H., 
Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.5: Breast Cancer Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.6: Total Cancer Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
FundinQ
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
Figure 3.7: Chronic Fatigue Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
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Figure 3.8: Cystic Fibrosis Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.9: Diabetes Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: Office 
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Figure 3.10: Epstein-Barr Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.11: HIV/Aids Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source:
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.12: Hypertension Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.13: Kidney Disease Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
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Figure 3.14: Lupus Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: N.I.H., 
Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.1S: Osteoporosis Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
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Figure 3.16: Parkinson’s Disease Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars).
Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.17: Prostate Cancer Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.18: Sexually Transmitted Diseases Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 
Dollars). Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.19: Sickle Cell Disease Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars).
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Figure 3.20: Spinal Cord Injury Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars).
Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.21: Stroke Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: N.I.H., 
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Figure 3.22: Sudden Infant Death Syndrome Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 
Dollars). Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
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Figure 3.23: Tuberculosis Funding Over Time (Log of 1984 Dollars). Source: 
N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories.
In summary, examination of these descriptive statistics gives us substantial 
information into the relative importance of research on the various diseases as viewed 
by the National Institutes of Health. What is missing is an understanding of the 
motivation behind their decisions about the level of spending for research on each 
disease, as well as the rate at which that spending is increased over the years.
3.5 Regression Results
Does the N.I.H. operate under a pure public interest theory of resource 
allocation? In an attempt to explain the logic of the decisions made by the N.I.H., a 
regression analysis was performed to determine whether the amount of research 
funding allocated to various diseases at the National Institutes of Health depends on 
the number of deaths from that disease. The dependent variable is real N.I.H. funding 
of research on that disease for each year from 1987 through 2001. Nominal dollar
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amounts have been converted to constant (1984) dollars using the annual Consumer 
Price Index published by the U.S. Department of Commerce.1 The independent 
variable is deaths from a disease in each year from 1979 through 1998, the latest year 
for which final death statistics are available. Death data were obtained from the 
Centers for Disease Control WONDER Mortality Database (http://wonder.cdc.eovl. 
Death statistics require two years for compilation and finalization, and budgets are 
prepared almost a year in advance. Consequently, the latest death data available when 
planning the 2001 fiscal year budget, for example, is the death data from 1998. It is 
quite possible, however, that a longer lag time than three years is needed for death data 
to be incorporated into research funding allocations. It may take a number of years for 
changing death patterns to be evaluated and research directed toward specific disease 
areas. It is therefore hypothesized that funding in any given year should respond to 
deaths from that disease in earlier years. In order to test the public interest hypothesis 
as fully as possible, various lags of the death data from three years to eight years prior 
to the funding data will be used in the analysis.
Because the incremental budgeting model quite accurately describes the 
budgeting process for the N.I.H., as well as other federal agencies, it is hypothesized 
that budget increases for many diseases in many years are simply based on a 
percentage of the previous year’s budget. Because there is a consistent upward trend 
to the amounts spent, a log-linear model was used.
'Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index [database on-line] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2001), Internet Available from ftp://ftD.bls.gov/Dub/sDecial-reauests/cDi- 
(accessed IS February 2001).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
3.5.1 Fifteen Year Pooled Data Regressions
Because the data contain both a cross-section of diseases and a time-series of 
fifteen years, a model incorporating panel data was deemed appropriate. There are 
twenty-one diseases tracked over the fifteen year period from 1987 through 2001, for a 
total of 315 observations. The diseases are listed in Table 3.3. There are no missing 
observations. The one-way fixed effects panel data model in Equation 1.1 is called 
Model One. This model allows the initial level of funding for each disease to be 
different, which is appropriate. However, the model assumes that the slopes are 
constant across time and across diseases. The equation estimated in Model One can be 
written as:
LNCFUNDS, = + £  SjDJt + ADRATIO,., + £ Y R  + &DYR, + (3.1)
where
LNCFUNDSit = log of N.I.H. research funding for disease i in year t
DRATIOjt-3 = log of deaths from disease i in year t divided by total deaths in year t-3
P  _ (1 if disease i = j 
j‘ 10 otherwise
YR = time trend
n v „  _ f 1 if t > 1999 
* ~ 10 otherwise
DYRDTH,, = DYR, * DRATIO,,
£DYRDTHit + &CDEM,., + #P D E M t., + elt
CDEM,., = I 
PDEM,, = {,1 if Democrats control the Presidency in year t-1 0 otherwise
1 if Democrats control the Congress in year t-1 
0 otherwise
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The dependent variable is the log of N.I.H. research funding for disease i in 
year t (LNCFUNDS). The independent variable measuring the burden of disease is the 
death ratio (DRATIO), which is deaths from disease i in year t-3 (t-4, ...,t-8) divided
by the total deaths from all diseases in year t-3 (t-4...... t-8). The number of deaths
from each disease is scaled by the total deaths for that year to eliminate the effect of 
increasing deaths over time due to population increases. If the N.I.H. allocates 
spending on the basis of the burden of disease, this variable should be positive.
A time trend variable, YR, was included to capture the incremental budgeting 
effect. A dummy variable, DYR, was included for the years 1999-2001, because in 
1998 Congress received the report on the N.I.H. they had commissioned from the 
Institute of Medicine, and the Congress vowed to double the N.I.H. budget over the 
next five years. Funding for many diseases took a major jump in 1999; however, 
some individual members of Congress as well as the Institute of Medicine report 
encouraged the N.I.H. to be more sensitive to the burden of disease when allocating 
funds. We included an interaction variable, DYRDTH, to capture any change in the 
relationship between funding and deaths after 1998.
Two political variables are included: CDEM and PDEM. These are time- 
based dummy variables which measure Democratic Party control of the Congress and 
Presidency in the year the funding was determined (year t-1). The controlling party 
for the House and Senate both was the Democrats from 1986-1994 and the 
Republicans from 199S-2000. The President was a Republican from 1986 to 1992 and 
a Democrat from 1993 to 2000. If Democrats are bigger spenders than Republicans, 
then the effects of these Democratic party variables on funding will be positive.
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The results of estimating Equation 3.1 (Model One) are shown in Table 3.4 
under the heading “With Dummy Variables.” The model, which has an R2 of 0.9225, 
explains a significant amount of the variation in LNCFUNDS. The model compares 
the first nineteen diseases to the omitted disease, which is tuberculosis. Cancer (all 
types combined) was omitted from this regression, so that breast cancer and prostate
Table 3.4 
Model One Regression Results 
15-Year Pooled Data 
_______________  Dependent Variable -  Log of Funding____________
With Dummy Variables Without Dummy Variables
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Alzheimer’s 2.4993 16.24* 2.5105 16.28*
Asthma 1.1084 8.08* 1.1110 8.06*
Breast Cancer 2.4693 9.41* 2.4977 9.52*
Chronic Fatigue -1.6679 -12.24* -1.6689 -12.18*
Cystic Fibrosis 1.0001 7.35* 1.0002 7.31*
Diabetes 2.7550 9.42* 2.7917 9.57*
Epstein-Barr -0.0437 -0.32 -0.0447 -0.33
HIV/Aids 4.0043 22.64* 4.0182 22.68*
Hypertension 2.0703 14.39* 2.0772 14.39*
Kidney Disease 2.2381 11.27* 2.2576 11.37*
Lupus 0.4329 3.18* 0.4328 3.17*
Osteoporosis 1.4129 10.38* 1.4126 10.33*
Parkinson’s 1.2938 9.19* 1.2997 9.20*
Prostate Cancer 1.0357 4.90* 1.0568 5.00*
STD’s 1.5348 11.26* 1.5339 11.20*
Sickle Cell 0.8206 6.03* 0.8199 5.99*
Spinal Cord 0.9156 6.66* 0.9185 6.65*
Stroke 1.7077 2.14** 1.8090 2.27**
SIDS 0.7814 5.70* 0.7832 5.69*
Intercept 8.6366 54.98* 8.8985 84.96*
Yr 0.1006 6.88* 0.0778 15.50*
Dratio -0.2619 -0.06 -0.5962 -0.14
Dyr 0.1130 -1.30 - -
Dyrdth 1.2010 0.88 - -
Cdem 0.1741 2.06** - -
Pdem -0.0053 -0.06 - -
Model R2 0.9224 0.9205
♦significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level.
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cancer could be included. A regression which included overall cancer and dropped 
breast cancer and prostate cancer specifically produced very similar results. Of the 
nineteen diseases then included, eighteen had intercepts that differed from the 
tuberculosis intercept. Again, this is evidence that the N.I.H. does not consider some 
diseases to be as deserving of research as other diseases, because the exogenous level 
of funding differs across diseases. Some diseases are more equal than others.
The death ratio was insignificant, which indicates that the N.I.H. is not altering 
funding priorities over time as the death ratio changes. A joint F-test for DRATIO and 
DYRDTH had a p-value o f 0.6726, so we could not reject the null hypothesis that they 
were both equal to zero. One explanation for this seemingly unexpected lack of 
significance of DRATIO might be that the data did not exhibit enough variation; 
however, an examination of DRATIO for each disease over time revealed that this was 
not a problem. Another possibility is that the effect of deaths is captured in the disease 
dummy variable. We explore this possibility below.
The time trend variable was positive and significant, providing support for the 
incremental budgeting theory. It appears that the initial distribution of funds across 
diseases is largely maintained over time, with overall budget increases causing most 
increases in individual disease funding. The coefficient of DYR, the dummy variable 
for the years 1999-2001, was not significant. The sudden increase in the N.I.H. budget 
had less impact on funding than the time trend. The interaction term, DYRDTH, was 
not significant, so the relationship between deaths and funding did not change after 
1999. The join F-test for DYR and DYRDTH had a p-value of 0.3916, so once again 
we could not reject the null hypothesis that they were both equal to zero.
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The political time-based dummy variable CDEM was positive and significant, 
capturing the decline in funding which took place in 199S after the Republicans took 
over Congress from the Democrats. However, the change from a Republican 
President to a Democratic one in 1993 did not significantly affect funding. Congress 
may simply be more important than the President in making funding decisions for the 
N.I.H.
Model One was re-estimated dropping the dummy variables DYR, DYRDTH, 
CDEM, and PDEM. These results are also shown in Table 3.4, under the heading 
“Without Dummy Variables.” The results are almost identical to those of the initial 
regression. The R2 is 0.920S, and the same eighteen diseases have intercepts which 
differ from that of tuberculosis, with approximately the same coefficients. Again, the 
time trend variable, YR, is significant and positive, while the death ratio variable, 
DRATIO, is not significant.
The values in Table 3.4 show us which diseases have an intercept that is 
significantly different than that of the excluded disease, tuberculosis. While this is 
useful information, we cannot judge from this the magnitude of the differences. We 
can, however, determine the percentage change in funding for each disease over the 
funding for tuberculosis for each of the diseases included in the model. These results 
are shown in Table 3.S. The transformation is from Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), 
and is shown below:
Letlny = $  + $ x + < © + e ,  where D = | q
Then Iny, = (/?,+ <5) + /?2x, when D = 1, and lny0 = /?, +• P2x^ when D = 0.
The percent change in y = e5 -  1 when D = 1 versus D = 0.
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We have computed the estimates for Model One without the dummy variables.
We can see from Table 3.5 that there is a significant percentage increase in the
funding for seventeen of the nineteen diseases. The largest of these is for HIV/Aids;
there is a fifty-five percent change in exogenous funding for HIV/Aids. Diabetes
received about sixteen percent more funding, while breast cancer experienced an
increase in exogenous funding of slightly more than eleven percent. These percentage
shifts in funding represent the higher priority given to those diseases by the N.I.H.
Only one disease has a significant decrease in the funding: chronic fatigue syndrome.
For two diseases, Epstein-Barr disease and stroke, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no change in the exogenous level of funding relative to tuberculosis.
Table 3.5 
Model One Estimation Results 
Fifteen Year Pooled Data 
_________________Estimation of Percentage Change in Funding___________
Variable Estimate (Percent) t-statistic
Alzheimer’s 11.31 5.96*
Asthma 2.04 4.87*
Breast Cancer 11.15 3.50*
Chronic Fatigue -0.81 -31.44*









Prostate Cancer 1.88 3.09*
STD’s 3.64 5.73*
Sickle Cell 1.27 4.09*
Spinal Cord 1.51 4.35*
Stroke 5.10 1.05
SIDS 1.19 3.94*
•significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
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While the fixed-effects Model One provides support for the incremental theory 
of governmental budgeting, and confirms that funding varies significantly across 
diseases even after controlling for deaths, it does not provide an explanation for the 
initial allocation across disease at the beginning of the period. In an attempt to explain 
these initial distributions, we compared the 1987 research funding for each disease to 
the 1979 death ratio of that disease. Death data for 1979 is the earliest available from 
the CDC WONDER Mortality Database. The following equation was estimated: 
LNFUNDSit = fi\ + /feLNDEATHSu + eit (3.2)
where
LNFUNDSit = Log of research funding for disease i in 1987 
LNDEATHSu = Log of deaths from disease i in 1979
The results of the estimation, Model Two, are shown in Table 3.6. The model 
has an R2 of 0.428S. There is a significant, positive relationship between research 
funding and deaths for each disease. The coefficients represent the elasticity of 
funding with respect to deaths; an increase in deaths from a disease of one percent 
causes an increase in funding of 0.38 percent We tested the model specification 
following Ramsey (1969,1974) and could not reject the hypothesis that no significant 
variables were omitted from the model.
Table 3.6 
Model Two 
Fifteen Year Pooled Data 





♦significant at the 0.01 level
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The level of deaths from each disease apparently mattered when the N.I.H. 
made initial funding decisions, which means that the N.I.H. is concerned with the 
public interest. Once the relative level of funding has been established, the N.I.H. 
seems to follow an incremental budgeting pattern. Another examination of the fifteen 
year data set was conducted to verify these conclusions. A regression was run using 
the 1979 death ratios and a time trend to explain the funding for all years from 1987- 
2001 and using ordinary least squares. These results were verified using a random 
coefficients model. The results of this estimation, Model Three, are shown in Table 
3.7. The equation estimated was as follows:
LNFUNDSit = yft + /ftDRATIOj + /?3YR + /?4DRATYR, + eit (3.3)
where
LNFUNDSit = Log of funding for disease i in year t
DRATIOi = Deaths from disease i in 1979 divided by total deaths in 1979




Fifteen Year Pooled Data 







•significant at the 0.01 level.
The model has an R2 of 0.4668. The coefficients of both the death ratio 
(DRATIO) and the time trend (YR) are significant and positive. The interaction term,
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DRATYR, was not significant. These results support our earlier contention that the 
N.I.H. allocates funding in accordance with the burden of diseases, and budgets using 
an incremental budgeting model. The regression was also run including the political 
dummy variables DYR, CDEM, and PDEM; however, these were never significant 
and did not add to the explanatory power of the model.
3.5.2 Ten Year Pooled Data Regressions
Data were collected on a broader cross-section of twenty-seven diseases for the 
ten year period 1992-2001, for a total of 270 observations. The additional diseases 
include some of the major killers in the United States: heart disease, 
pneumonia/influenza, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), liver disease, 
and lung cancer. Schizophrenia is also included. Table 3.8 gives the dataset funding 
as a percent of the N.I.H. total budget for the years 1992-2001, and Table 3.9 
compares dataset deaths to total deaths for the years 1989-1998. The percentage of 
funding covered by this study is always at least sixty percent of total N.I.H. funding, 
while the fraction of total deaths contained in the death dataset is about two-thirds.
Table 3.8 
Research Funding Data 






1992 $10,010,368 $ 6,138,923 0.6133
1993 10,328,117 6,498,086 0.6292
1994 10,910,969 7,072,782 0.6482
1995 11,340,841 7,444,928 0.6565
1996 11,880,847 7,941,119 0.6684
1997 12,770,771 8,397,660 0.6576
1998 13,622,386 8,776,865 0.6443
1999 15,597,189 10,453,800 0.6702
2000 17,793,587 11,785,300 0.6623
2001 20,300,000 12,299,500 0.6059
Source: Office o1: Communications ant Public Liaison, N.I.H. Almanac, 1999.









1989 2,150,466 1,412,539 0.6569
1990 2,148,463 1,412,761 0.6577
1991 2,169,518 1,425,941 0.6573
1992 2,175,613 1,431,841 0.6581
1993 2,268,553 1,497,628 0.6602
1994 2,278,994 1,499,735 0.6581
1995 2,312,132 1,521,695 0.6581
1996 2,314,690 1,516,580 0.6552
1997 2,314,245 1,505,035 0.6503
1998 2,337,258 1,513,487 0.6475
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics, Annual.
Cardiovascular disease is the number one cause of death in the United States 
and has been for the second half of the twentieth century. COPD ranks consistently 
fourth or fifth, while pneumonia/influenza is generally sixth (see Appendix A). Liver 
disease was the tenth leading cause of death from 1994-1998, and was the ninth 
leading cause of death for 1984-1990. Even though these diseases accounted for a 
substantial number of deaths, the N.I.H. does not have statistics on the funding for 
research on these diseases before 1992. Failure to collect this data was one of the 
shortcomings cited in the Congressionally-mandated review of the N.I.H. ordered in 
1996. This study is the first to examine the relationship between these devastating 
diseases and the amount of N.I.H. research funding directed toward them.
A pooled time-series cross-section regression was used to estimate Equation 
3.4. As with the fifteen year data set, the regressions were run in a one-way fixed 
effects format (the intercept varies only by disease). The regressions were run using 
both total cancer (all sites) funding and deaths, and the separate numbers for breast
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cancer, prostate cancer, and lung cancer. There was no significant difference in the 
results. Also, the model was estimated with and without the dummy variables.
The equation estimated was as follows:
.V -I
LNCFUNDS,, = #  + £  SjDjt + $  DRATIO it_3 + £ Y R +>9, DYR, + (3.4)
7-1
$  DYRDTH jt + &CDEM,., + /^PDEM,., + eit
The variables have interpretations identical to those in Equation 3.1. The model was 
estimated both with and without the dummy variables. The results of this regression, 
Model Four, are shown in Table 3.10.
For ease of comparison with the results of the fifteen-year study, the omitted 
disease is again tuberculosis. Of the twenty-five diseases included, the intercept 
varied significantly from that of tuberculosis for nineteen of the diseases in the model 
estimated with dummy variables. The exogenous level of funding for sixteen of these 
diseases is greater than that for tuberculosis, afier controlling for the number of 
deaths from each disease. Conversely, cardiovascular disease, COPD and 
pneumonia/influenza (three of the deadliest diseases) had intercepts that did not vary 
statistically from that of tuberculosis. We cannot conclude that these diseases received 
higher exogenous levels of funding than tuberculosis. Chronic fatigue, Epstein-Barr, 
and lupus had intercepts that were significantly lower than that of tuberculosis.
As in the fifteen year data results, the time trend was highly significant, again 
lending support to the incremental budgeting theory. The measure of deaths from 
each disease, DRATIO, was not significantly different from zero. This lack of 
significance was not due to any lack of variation in the death ratio data during this 
time. The joint F-test of the hypothesis that both DRATIO and DYRDTH were equal
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Table 3.10 
Model Four Regression Results 
Ten Year Pooled Data
Dependent Variable = Log ol Funding
With Dummy Variables Without Dummy Variables
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Alzheimer’s 1.8360 20.65* 1.8418 21.34*
Asthma 0.4942 6.29* 0.4955 6.34*
Breast Cancer 2.0042 14.80* 2.0191 16.22*
Cardiovascular 3.3323 1.73 3.5906 2.12**
Chronic Fatigue -2.2042 -28.26* -2.2047 -28.35*
Cystic Fibrosis 0.1888 2.42** 0.1884 2.42**
Diabetes 1.8837 11.64* 1.9028 2.97*
Epstein-Barr -0.9128 -11.70* -0.9133 -11.94*
HIV/Aids 3.3099 30.94* 3.3196 32.85*
Hypertension 1.1772 14.33* 1.1808 14.58*
Kidney Disease 1.3837 13.01* 1.3935 13.89*
Lupus -0.4289 -5.51* -0.4290 -5.52*
Osteoporosis 0.7117 9.14* 0.7115 9.16*
Parkinson’s 0.5486 6.79* 0.5515 6.90*
Prostate Cancer 0.6717 5.85* 0.6830 6.36*
STD’s -0.7222 9.26* 0.7217 9.28*
Sickle Cell -0.0715 -0.92 -0.0719 -0.92
Spinal Cord 0.0222 0.28 0.0236 0.30
Stroke 1.0084 2.61* 1.0593 3.10*
SIDS -0.1335 -1.71 -0.1326 -1.70
COPD 0.0046 0.02 0.0367 0.16
Liver Disease 1.1560 10.82* 1.1659 11.57*
Lung Cancer 0.9540 2.42** 1.0059 2.89*
Pneumonia/Influenza 0.1368 0.60 0.1654 0.82
Schizophrenia 0.9379 12.03* 0.9375 12.06*
Intercept 10.1988 125.66* 10.1512 172.67*
Dratio -0.7688 -0.20 -1.2680 -0.37
Yr 0.0467 3.06* 0.0555 14.79*
Dyr 0.0626 1.14 - -
Dyrdth 0.0804 0.28 - -
Cdem 0.0153 0.31 - -
Pdem 0.0277 0.60 - -
’ significant at the 0.01 level, ’ ’ significant at the 0.0S level.
to zero had a p-value of 0.4548. This is the same result as that which occurred in the 
fifteen year study, and supports the theory that incremental budgeting dominates once
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the initial levels of funding are allocated. Changes in the death share after the initial 
year do not appear to alter funding allocations. Cardiovascular disease alone kills over
800,000 people a year in the United States. Including these additional diseases gives a 
clearer picture of the relationship between N.I.H. research funding and deaths from a 
disease during the last decade.
As expected, the time trend variable is positive and highly significant, 
supporting the incremental budgeting theory. DYR, corresponding to the 
Congressional decision to double N.I.H. funding in five years (1999-2003), was not 
significant in this regression (or in the earlier one). Instead, the time trend accounts for 
essentially all of the increase in funding. Again, the interaction variable, DYRDTH, 
was not significant, indicating that the slope of the relationship between DRATIO and 
LNCFUNDS did not change in 1999. These results were confirmed by a join F-test of 
the significance of DYR and DYRDTH, which had a p-value of 0.8972.
Neither of the political variables, CDEM or PDEM, was significant The 
change from a Democratically-controlled Congress to a Republican Congress (CDEM) 
did not materially affect funding; this is a different result than the one obtained in the 
fifteen year panel data regression. The difference between the results in the ten and 
fifteen year regressions may be due to the differences in the diseases in the two 
datasets. The ten year dataset contains all of the top ten disease causes of death; this is 
more than twice as many deaths as that contained in the fifteen year data. The 
amount of funding for these major killer diseases may not fluctuate as much with 
political changes as funding for those diseases that kill fewer people. It is logical for 
Congress to fund research on those diseases which impact the lives of many voters.
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Another explanation for the difference in the results may be the reduced variation in 
funding over the ten year period as compared to the fifteen year period.
As in the fifteen year analysis, we are interested in the magnitude of the 
intercept changes across diseases. Table 3.9 shows the percentage change in funding 
by disease. Of the twenty-five diseases included in the regression, seventeen had 
percentage changes in funding that were significant relative to the funding for 
tuberculosis. The largest was HIV/Aids, whose exogenous level of funding was 26.65
Table 3.11 
Model Four Estimation Results 




Breast Cancer 6.53 6.97*
Cardiovascular 35.25 0.57
Chronic Fatigue -0.89 -103.73*









Prostate Cancer 0.98 4.61*
STD’s 1.06 6.61*
Sickle Cell -0.07 -0.96




Liver Disease 2.21 6.83*
Lung Cancer 1.73 1.82
Pneumonia/Influenza 0.18 0.75
Schizophenia 1.55 7.83*
‘significant at the 0.01 level, ‘ ‘ significant at the 0.05 level
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percent higher than that of the omitted disease, tuberculosis. Other diseases with large 
funding increases were breast cancer (6.53 percent), Alzheimer’s disease (5.31 
percent), and diabetes (5.70 percent). Three diseases had significant percentage 
decreases in funding: chronic fatigue (-0.89 percent), Epstein-Barr (-0.60 percent), 
lupus (-0.35 percent). For four of the deadliest diseases, cardiovascular disease, 
stroke, COPD, and pneumonia/influenza, we cannot reject the hypothesis that their 
funding did not differ significantly from that of tuberculosis.
3.53  Separate Regressions
In addition to the panel data regressions, separate time-series regressions were 
run for each of the twenty-one diseases. The graphs of funding by disease presented 
earlier clearly showed that the slopes of the funding curves were not the same for all 
diseases. The fixed-effect models’ assumption that this condition is true is not 
realistic. There is a trade-off between the loss of information which can only be 
obtained from the use of pooled data, and the gain from a more accurate assumption 
about the rate of change in funding for various diseases over time. As in the earlier 
models, the dependent variable in each equation is the log of constant dollar funding 
by the N.I.H. on that disease (LNCFUNDS), and the independent variable is the log of 
deaths from that disease lagged three years (LNDEATH). The equation estimated 
was:
LNCFUNDS, = #  + &LNDEATHtJ + e, (3.6)
The results of these twenty-one individual time-series regressions are 
summarized in Table 3.12. The intercept term was significant for fifteen of the 
twenty-one diseases, showing that the exogenous levels of funding set in 1987 were a
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Table 3.12 
Fifteen Year Separate Regression Results 




Breast Cancer -161.9915* 16.3233*
All Cancer -13.9017** 2.1479*
Chronic Fatigue 7.9273* -0.0614
Cystic Fibrosis 10.2866** 0.0388
Diabetes 6.9691* 0.4920**







Prostate Cancer -62.3313* 7.0450*
STD’s 14.5634* -0.7635*
Sickle Cell 8.4470* 0.3104**




*significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
prime determinant of later funding. The models are in Iog-log form, so the 
coefficients on LNDEATH represent the elasticity of disease research funding with 
respect to deaths from that disease. For the following diseases, a change in deaths was 
not a significant predictor of a change in research funding: chronic fatigue, cystic 
fibrosis, Epstein-Barr syndrome, hypertension, stroke, and sudden infant death 
syndrome. Of these diseases, stroke was consistently the third cause of death from 
1984-1998. Chronic fatigue syndrome and Epstein-Barr syndrome almost never kill 
anyone, so it is not surprising that funding for these diseases is not related to deaths. 
Even hypertension (by itself), cystic fibrosis, and sudden infant death syndrome cause 
a relatively low number of deaths. Two diseases had elasticities that were negative
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and significant: sexually transmitted diseases and tuberculosis. These diseases had 
increases even though the number of deaths from them was either declining or flat, 
indicating that the N.I.H. is considering other factors when allocating funding for these 
diseases, such as the fact that both of these diseases are communicable.
Those diseases for which the elasticity of funding with respect to deaths was 
positive and significant were Alzheimer’s, asthma, breast cancer, cancer (all types), 
HIV/Aids, hypertension, kidney disease, lupus, osteoporosis, Parkinson’s disease, 
prostate cancer, sickle cell disease, and spinal cord injury. Of these diseases, only 
cancer and diabetes were in the top ten causes of death for all fifteen years; Aids was 
in the top ten causes for seven of those fifteen years. All of the estimates were 
positive, and ranged from a low of 1.0648 for Parkinson’s disease to a high of 16.3233 
for breast cancer. Only asthma, breast cancer, and prostate cancer had elasticity 
estimates greater than three. An increase in deaths for any of these three diseases 
generated increases in research funding that were disproportionately large. An 
increase in breast cancer deaths of one percent, for example, caused a 16.59 percent 
increase in research funding for breast cancer.
It should be kept in mind that because there are only fifteen observations for 
each disease, the statistical reliability of these estimates is not strong. Because of the 
low degrees of freedom, the time dummy variables were not included in these models.
3.6 Conclusions
The public interest theory of biomedical research hypothesizes that policy­
makers should allocate research funds in such a way as to provide the maximum 
benefit to all of the citizens of the nation. A logical interpretation would be to
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evaluate whether the N.I.H. is distributing research dollars in accordance with the 
distribution of the burden of disease. This chapter evaluated specifically the 
relationship between disease research funding allocations from 1987-2001 and one 
measure of the burden of disease, total deaths from each disease. Another important 
theory we tested is whether or not the N.I.H. follows an incremental budgeting model. 
We also included variables to assess the impact of political changes on the funding 
process.
For the both fifteen year and ten year panel datasets, our results showed that 
changes in the burden of disease measure (DRATIO) once the initial allocations had 
been made did not significantly affect the distribution of research funding across 
diseases. The burden of disease did impact the initial allocation of funds; however, 
after that, the process of incremental budgeting explains increases in funding. The 
time trend variable, YR, was always positive and highly significant.
The political variables PDEM and DYR, capturing the effect of the election of 
a Democratic President and the 1998 Congressional decision to double the N.I.H. 
overall budget, had no impact on funding in the fifteen year dataset regression 
estimation. These results were substantiated by our examination o f the larger ten-year 
panel data set. However, we did not get consistent results when measuring the effect 
of the change from a Democratically-controlled Congress to a Republican Congress 
(CDEM). CDEM was significant and positive in the fifteen year dataset regression; 
the level of funding decreased after 199S. This result was not confirmed by the 
estimation of the ten year dataset regression; CDEM was positive, but not significant. 
We cannot conclude, then, that political factors do not affect N.I.H. funding.
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For both the fifteen and ten year panel data sets, alternative specifications of 
the model were used to test for robustness. Using either a four year or five year lag 
between deaths and funding decisions did not alter the results. Including a lag of 
funding as an explanatory variable provided strong support for the incremental 
budgeting theory, but did not provide any illumination about the allocation among the 
various diseases, which was what we were seeking. Finally, the use of first 
differencing and shift-share formats for the models was tried and rejected, as the fit 
with the data was not good.
The separate evaluations of twenty different diseases over the period 1987- 
2001 found a significant positive correlation between deaths and funding over time for 
most diseases; however, the sample size did not permit the inclusion of time trend or 
political variables.
In subsequent sections, this dissertation will attempt to explain these 
differences across diseases using both political and special interest group variables. 
Additional data on more diseases will be included.
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CHAPTER 4 
CROSS SECTIONAL DATA AND REGRESSIONS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the allocation of N.I.H. research funding across diseases 
for the most recent year data is available. This cross-sectional data enables us to 
consider a larger number of diseases, alternative measures of the burden of diseases, 
and the effects of politics and special interest group influence that were not possible 
wit the pooled data. The number of diseases included was expanded to forty-two. 
N.I.H. research funding levels for this analysis were for the year 1999, and death data 
was consequently that for 1996, the latest year available when funding decisions were 
made in 1998. The diseases, the number of deaths, the years of life lost (YLL), and 
the amount of funding for research are shown in Table 4.1. Funding data were 
obtained from the N.I.H. web page (http://www.N.I.H..gov) and from correspondence 
with N.I.H. employees. Death data was obtained from the Centers for Disease Control 
web page (http://www.cdc.govl using the CDC Wonder Mortality Database search 




Disease Deaths* YLL** Discharges* Funds***
Alzheimer’s 21,397 171,206.1 16,000 S 406,500
Asthma 5,665 124,430.4 474,000 140,400
Breast Cancer 43,447 760,035.6 123,000 474,700
Cancer 539,508 8,222,523.5 1,805,000 3,377,300
Cardiovascular 733,262 8,691,801.4 4,229.000 1,327,100
Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selectee Categories. Centers for Disease Control,
WONDER Mortality Database. *1996 figures. **years of life lost 1996. ***in 
thousands of nominal dollars.
(Table 4.1 continued)
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Variable Deaths* YLL** Discharges* Funds***
Chronic Fatigue 4 26.7 N/A 6,700
Cystic Fibrosis 430 22,409.6 14,000 71,600
Diabetes 61,766 876,685.1 503,000 457,600
Epstein Barr 16 864.7 9,000 27,100
HIV/Aids 31,123 1,187,247.4 101,000 1,792,700
Hypertension 12,945 147,655.3 284,000 175,400
Kidney Disease 30,586 376,768.4 485,000 247,900
Lupus 1,404 38,467.3 23,000 46,100
Osteoporosis 1,172 9,853.3 175,000 136,700
Parkinson’s 11,845 103,995.1 20,000 132,300
Prostate Cancer 34,122 355,490.5 90,000 177,500
STD’s 101 2,330.2 N/A 136,400
Sickle Cell 507 21,835.1 56,000 50,400
Spinal Cord 5,821 229,229.1 72,000 62,100
Stroke 153,041 1,584,088.5 955,000 186,000
s m s 3,050 232,105.0 N/A 49,300
Tuberculosis 1,202 21,567.5 7,000 72,800
COPD 98,647 1,124,605.6 137,000 80,000
Liver Disease 28,881 637,909.1 112,000 185,637
Lung Cancer 152,007 2,290,162.4 180,000 163,000
Pneumonia/Influenza 83,717 895,418.1 1,223,000 73,000
Schizophrenia 420 5,454.6 257,000 200,600
ALS 4,159 68,342.3 N/A 17,200
Arthritis 2,908 32,345.4 449,000 238,800
Autism 2 76.5 N/A 40,000
Ovarian Cancer 13,342 209,865.5 31,000 65,400
Fibromyalgia 42 645.4 9,000 6,400
Hepatitis C 2,577 57,843.9 7,000 39,700
Malaria 4 136.8 N/A 25,300
Multiple Sclerosis 2,291 51,923.4 20,000 96,300
Muscular Dystrophy 996 35,191.3 6,000 16,700
Nutritional Problems 3,594 32,526.0 15,000 587,500
Obesity 2,097 53,114.2 16,000 161,400
Cervical Cancer 4,513 107,530.7 N/A 75,200
Colorectal Cancer 56,515 765,016.8 155,000 175,900
Epilepsy 1,413 46,883.1 N/A 81,700
Septicemia 23,707 452,289.2 355,000 16,500
Source: N.I.H., Funding by Selected Categories. Centers for Disease Control,
WONDER Mortality Database. *1996 figures. **years of life lost 1996. ***in 
thousands of nominal dollars.
Examination of this broader collection of diseases reveals the same variation 
across diseases in the levels of funding per death from a disease. Figure 4.1 shows the


















F u n d i n g
Deaths
Figure 4.1: Log of Total Deaths (1996) and Funding Per Death by Disease (1999). Source: Office of Communications 
and Public Liaison, Funding by Selected Categories. Centers for Disease Control, WONDER Mortality Database.
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log of 1999 funding per death for seventeen of the forty-two diseases and the log of 
the number of deaths from that disease in 1996. The top ten causes of death are 
included, as are the five diseases that caused the fewest deaths in the dataset. If 
funding is proportional to deaths, then the ratio should be the same for all diseases. As 
the graph shows, the ratio fluctuates quite a lot. Also, there is something of an inverse 
relationship depicted: the funding per death increases as the number of deaths
declines.
Because the analysis only covers 1999, it was possible to gather other 
explanatory variables in addition to the number of deaths as a measure of the burden 
of disease. It was also possible to create variables to measure the effect of special 
interest group influence and public interest. The National Institutes of Health has an 
obligation to act in the pubic interest. Ways in which they might do this include such 
things as reducing the burden of disease on our society and preventing the spread of 
contagious diseases. There are several possible methods of determining the burden of 
disease to society, such as the number of deaths from a disease, the incidence of 
disease, the cost of treatment, the severity of the disease, or lost work time and income 
foregone to a disease. Burden of disease measures are used to quantify the impact of 
various diseases on our society.
Total deaths as a measure of the burden of disease have the property that all 
deaths are equal in their undesirability. The death of one person from any disease is 
no more important to society than the death of any other person from any other 
disease. This measure ignores such factors as the age, sex, race, income, or 
contribution to society of a person when determining the effect of his death on society
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as a whole. Using total deaths, then, would mean that the death of a white child was 
not more important than the death of a black child; the death of an infant was no worse 
than the death of an eighty-year-old man; the death of the President of the United 
States was no more devastating than the death of an unemployed woman; and the 
death of Albert Schweitzer was no different than the death of Adolf Hitler. The 
complete impartiality of this measure is both an advantage and a disadvantage. If a 
society values equality and abhors discrimination, it is a suitable ethical measure of 
the impact of deaths. It is expected that the N.I.H. would spend more money on 
research for diseases that kill the most people, so this variable should have a positive 
impact on research funding allocated to a disease.
However, in a purely economic sense, total deaths from a disease may not be 
the best measure of the burden of that disease to society. Economically speaking, all 
deaths are not equal. The death of a forty-year-old man is more costly than the death 
of an eighty-year-old man, because the death of the younger man deprives society of 
his labor and productivity for a larger number of years. This reduces national income 
below what it would have been had the man not died. Deaths at earlier ages, then, 
impose larger costs to society than deaths at later ages. A measure of the burden of 
disease which takes the age at death into account is the years of life lost to a disease. 
The total years of life lost (YLL) to a disease is thus weighted by both age of deaths 
and number of deaths. The years of life lost to each disease in 1996 is also presented 
in Table 4.1.
Note that this measure is not based on productivity of each individual as is the 
Disability Adjusted Life Year. The weighting scheme in that construction puts a zero
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value on infants (who earn no income), rises over time to age 27, and falls thereafter, 
approaching zero again at very high ages.1 The ethical implications of such a 
construction are staggering. If infants receive zero weight, why not unemployed 
people, disabled people, prisoners? Years of life lost does not create these ethical 
dilemma, and is less offensive to our sense of fairness. Distinctions based on age do 
not create discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, or socio-economic status. 
Within a given age group, all people are treated equally. However, there is no denying 
that this measure discriminates against older people and heavily favors children. This 
may be perceived as acceptable discrimination, given that society recognizes the finite 
nature of life and the inevitability of death at some age. Distributing research dollars 
among diseases on the basis of years of life lost may be acceptable to society as a 
whole, but it probably doesn't please older people, who are highly participatory voters. 
If the N.I.H. attaches more value to the deaths of younger people than to deaths of 
older people, we would expect the effect of years of life lost on funding to be positive.
Another useful indicator of the burden of disease is provided by the National 
Hospital Discharge Survey. When patients are discharged from a hospital, the reason 
for their visit, called a diagnosis code, is recorded by hospital staff. In this survey, the 
first-listed diagnosis code on the patient's discharge from a hospital is used to 
construct the number of hospital discharges (Discharges) each year attributable to each 
disease. This information, also shown in Table 4.1, was available for thirty-four of the 
forty-two diseases in the study. Inpatient hospitalization is a proxy for both the 
severity of a disease and the cost of treatment, because hospitalization is reserved for
‘C.J.L Murray, “Quantifying the Burden of disease: The Technical Basis for Disability-Adjusted Life 
Years," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 1994,72(3):435-436.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
very sick people and it is very expensive. Data from the 1996 survey is used in the 
analysis, because that is the data that would have been available at the time of the 
initial 1999 budget formulation. We predict that this measure should have a positive 
impact, if the N.I.H. spends more money on those diseases that make people sickest or 
require the costliest treatment.
The N.I.H. has a duty to act in the best interest of the public. Another way in 
which the N.I.H. could perform a public health function is to act to prevent the spread 
of communicable diseases. Consequently, we might expect to observe that the N.I.H. 
allocates more research dollars to those diseases which can be transmitted from one 
person to another. A dummy variable was constructed to indicate whether or not a 
particular disease was contagious. It is expected that this variable will have a positive 
coefficient in a regression estimation if prevention of contagion is a consideration of 
the N.I.H. in making budgetary decisions.
The effect of special interest groups on the research dollar allocation process is 
measured by constructing several lobbying variables. Special interest group theory 
argues that organized groups with something to gain from federal regulation will 
spend money to exert influence with congressmen. Congressmen can reward these 
special interest group contributors with favorable legislation, and the cost of this 
legislation is passed on to the millions of taxpayers. This is the principal of 
concentrated benefits and diversified costs. Data on the existence of a registered 
lobbyist for a particular disease and the amount of lobbying dollars spent were 
collected from the Center for Responsive Politics.2 A tiered variable was designed.
2 Center for Responsive Politics, “Influence Inc.: Lobbyists’ Spending in Washington,” Internet 
Available from http://www.ooensecrets.org/lobbv/ (accessed 2 March 2001).
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The first dummy variable, LOB, took the value of 1 if there was a registered lobbyist
for a disease advocacy group and spending was less than $100,000 during the 1997-
1998 election cycle. The dummy variables LOB1 measured the impact of lobbying
dollars spent in 1997 and 1998 greater than $100,000 but less than $200,000. The
dummy variable LOB2 measured the effect of spending more than $200,000 during
1997-1998. It is predicted that these lobbying expenditures will have a positive effect
on research spending for that disease.
4.2 Regression Analysis Using Death Data
The initial regression model for this cross sectional analysis, Model One, was
LNFUNDS,, = #  + £LNDEATHSit.3 + £LOBt.,+ &LOB1,.,
+£LOB2,_, + f lsCOMM+ei (4 la)
where
LNFUNDSit = Funding in 1999 for disease i
LNDEATHSu-3 = Deaths in 1996 from disease i
r h r  = f l disease advocacy group has a registered lobbyist and spent < $ 100,000 
[0 otherwise
r h r  i (1 if lobbying dollars > $100,000 but < $200,000 
(0 otherwise
t  nR? =  i * if lobbying dollars > $200,000 
‘•i (0 otherwise
r n u u  _ (1 if the disease is communicable 
COMM -  (ootherwise
The results from this regression are shown in Table 4.2. The log-log 
specification was chosen over the linear model based on the Box-Cox likelihood
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estimator test of the relative sizes of the sum of squared errors.3 The model has an R2
of 0.5721, and the F-statistic for overall significance of the model is 9.62.
Table 4.2 
Cross Section Model One 
Using Deaths as Explanatory Variable 










*significant at the 0.01 level
The coefficient of LNDEATHS is positive and significant, which is what we 
expected. An increase of one percent in deaths from a disease causes an increase in 
funding of 0.2264 percent. The LOB and LOB1 variables were insignificant, 
indicating that very low levels of lobbying expenditures did not have an impact. 
However, LOB2 was positive and significant, indicating that special interest group 
influence was effective in increasing funding. Because the amounts of lobbying 
dollars included in this variable range from $200,000 to $1 million, it is difficult to 
place an exact numerical impact on the effect of lobbying. However, it is certainly fair 
to say that those diseases which spend large amounts of money lobbying Congress 
apparently get increased research funds. This result substantiates the special interest 
group theory approach to regulation, which is not unexpected.
3 William E. Griffiths, R. Carter Hill, and George G. Judge, Learning and Practicing Econometrics, 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1993), 345-346.
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The public interest group variable COMM, on the other hand, does not have 
the expected result. The COMM variable, which signifies a contagious disease, does 
not appear to be an important element in the distribution of research dollars. Its 
coefficient is not significant. Another interesting point is that the intercept term is 
large and highly significant. While the intercept term captures the effect of any 
omitted variables, it also represents the exogenous level of funding allocation to a 
disease by the N.I.H. The incremental theory of budgetary management discussed in 
the previous section tells us that the initial decisions about funding levels made by the 
N.I.H. are likely to be maintained over the years.
4.2.1 Regression Analysis Using Grouped Death Data
Model One postulates a linear relationship between funding and deaths, and 
one overall intercept term (exogenous funding level) that is the same for all diseases. 
The study of the panel data in Chapter 3, however, provided substantial evidence that 
the intercept term is not the same for all diseases and that the relationship between 
funding and deaths may not be linear. Consequently, we also estimated a step-wise 
function, which divided the data into groups based on the number of deaths, allowing 
the relationship between funding and deaths to be different for varying levels of 
deaths. The equation estimated was:
LNFUNDS,, = /?, + &DEATH2,., + /?3DEATH3t., + &DEATH4,., (4. lb)
+ /?sDEATH5t . 3 + p b LOB,., + /?7LOB 1,., + ALOB2,., + #COMM  + e,
where
LNFUNDSit = Log of funding for disease i in 1999
DEATH2t.3 = Diseases causing between 2,000 and 9,999 deaths in 1996
DEATH3t-3 = Diseases causing between 10,000 and 34,999 deaths in 1996
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DEATH4,.3 = Diseases causing between 35,000 and 99,999 deaths in 1996
DEATH5t.3 = Diseases causing at least 100,000 deaths in 1996
And LOB, LOB1, LOB2, and COMM have interpretations identical to those in 
Equation 1.1. The omitted (reference) group is diseases which killed less than 2,000 
people in 1996.
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 4.3. This estimation gives a 
clearer and more intuitively-pleasing picture of the relationship between funding and 
deaths. The coefficient of DEATH2 is not significant, indicating that the number of 
deaths is not the motivator of funding for diseases which kill relatively few people.
Table 4 3  
Death Groups Regression Results 













’ significant at the 0.01 leve .
The coefficients of DEATH3, DEATH4, and DEATH5 are all positive and 
significant; what is equally informative is that the coefficients become larger as the 
number of deaths increases. This makes sense. The coefficient o f DEATHS is almost
twice as large as the coefficient of DEATH3. These results tell us, then, that the 
relationship between funding for a disease and deaths from that disease becomes 
stronger as the number of deaths increases.
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The special interest group variables have the same signs and significances as 
they did in the previous regression. That is, neither LOB nor LOB I was significant; 
but LOB2 had a coefficient that was positive and significant, supporting the theory 
that large amounts of lobbying dollars do alter funding outcomes. As before, the 
communicable disease variable, COMM, is not significant. This is puzzling.
4.2.2 Regression Analysis Using Legislative Variables
The analysis of the forces driving the allocation of research funding was 
expanded to include more specific Congressional influence variables based on 
information taken from the Congressional Record. Legislators of the 105th Congress 
(1997-1998) enacted the appropriations bills for the N.I.H. and its component 
institutes for fiscal year 1999. An examination of the index of bills introduced and 
those that became law gives us some indication of the direction which Congress 
wishes the N.I.H. to take in research.
Consequently, the Congressional Record for the 105th Congress was searched 
for all bills pertaining to the N.I.H. in general, any institutes or offices of the N.I.H., 
and all forty-two of the specific diseases in the data set. Two dummy variables were 
created. One, labeled INTRO, indicated that a bill supporting additional research on a 
specific disease had been introduced in that Congress; the other, PASSED, indicated 
that a bill pertaining to that specific disease had become public law. Our goal was to 
test the hypothesis that members of Congress directly affect the research allocation 
decisions of the N.I.H. by either introducing or passing legislation. The equation in 
Model One was modified to include these additional variables:
LNFUNDS,, = f t  + ^LNDEATHS .,.3 + £LOB3t., + £BILL, + e, (4. lc)
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where in Estimate One:
n n  t _ {1 if a bill supporting research in disease i was introduced 
" 10 otherwise
and in Estimate Two:
qtt r f 1 if a bill specifically designating research on disease i passed 
■" (0 otherwise
The remaining variables have the same interpretation as they did in Equation 4.1.
The results of the modified regression, shown in Table 4.4, do not support the
hypothesis that the N.I.H. altered 1999 research allocations in response to
Congressional interest in pushing research on a particular disease. While there were a
number of bills introduced recommending increases in funding for particular diseases,
very few passed into law. These few did not have enough impact to substantially
affect the distribution of funds by the N.I.H. Neither INTRO nor PASSED was
significant in any regression.
Table 4.4
Regression Including Legislative Variables 
Dependent Variable = Log of Funding
Variable Estimate 1 t-statistic Estimate 2 t-statistic
Intercept 9.1451 19.88* 9.1471 19.83*
Lndeath 0.2257 4.20 0.2260 4.20*
Lob 0.3608 0.76 0.3974 0.91
Lobl 0.6557 1.22 0.6721 1.26
Lob2 1.2021 2.83* 1.2378 3.17*
Comm 0.4466 0.96 0.4479 0.96
BILL (Intro) 0.0829 0.22 - -
BILL (Passed) - - 0.0436 -0.08
R* 0.5727 0.5721
•significant at the 0.01 level
As in the earlier regression, LOB2 continued to be both significant and 
positive. An examination of the relationship between lobbying and the introduction or 
passage of bills was informative, as there was a significant, positive correlation
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between both INTRO and LOB2 and between PASSED and LOB2. Separate 
regressions using INTRO and PASSED in place of LOB2 still did not produce 
estimates which were significant. It is logical that lobbying affects the introduction 
and passage of bills in Congress. The relationship between the introduction of bills 
and the direction of N.I.H. spending is less clear.
4 J  Regression Analysis Using Years of Life Lost Data
The regression model was altered by using years of life lost (YLL) as the 






1 = the last age group
ex = life expectancy at age x in the United States in 1996
dx = deaths at age x in the United States in 1996
The age groups are those used by the Centers for Disease Control in its WONDER
Mortality Database. Twelve groups were used; the youngest group is “under 1 year”
and the oldest group is “over 85 years”. The life expectancy used was that provided by
the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. In this calculation for YLL, both
decreases in the age of death and increases in the number of deaths will cause years of
life lost to become larger. Thus resulting equation, Model Two, was estimated as
LNFUNDS, = A + A LN Y LL^ * &LOB,, + /^LOBl,., +
ALOB2,., + &COMM + e,
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where LNYLL = log of years o f life lost to disease i in 1996, and LOB, LOB1, LOB2 
and COMM have the same definitions as in Equation 4.1.
The results for Model Two are shown in Table 4.5, and are almost identical to 
those of Model One. The R2 is 0.5586, with the overall F-value being 9.11. The 
variables have the same sign, the same significance, and almost the same coefficients 
as in the model using total deaths as the measure of burden of disease. Years of life 
lost as a measure of the burden of disease does not appear to be any more or any less 
important to the N.I.H. than total deaths from a disease. Thus we cannot infer that the 
N.I.H. places more emphasis on researching the diseases that kill younger people as 
opposed to the elderly.
Table 4.5 
Cross Section Model Two 
Using Years of Life Lost as Explanatory Variable 










•significant at the 0.01 level 
4.4 Regression Analysis Using Hospital Discharge Data
The third regression model, Model Three, used the number of hospital 
discharges for each of the disease codes during the year 1996 as the measure of burden 
of disease. The equation estimated was:
LNFUNDSit = $  + &LNDISCHM + &LOB2,., + e, (4.3)
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where LNDISCH was the log of hospital discharges having a first-listed diagnosis
code corresponding to disease i. Hospitals code each patient by the primary cause
requiring hospitalization. This information is then collected for use in the National
Hospital Discharge Survey. The LOB2 variable has the same definition as before, that
is, lobbying expenditures greater than $200,000. LOB, LOB1, and COMM were
dropped from this model, because they were never significant and they reduced the
degrees of freedom below thirty unnecessarily. The results are shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 
Cross Section Model Three 
Using Hospital Discharges as Explanatory Variable 







•significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 evel.
The National Hospital Discharge Survey provided data on the number of 
discharges for thirty-four of the forty-two diseases in the cross section. Data on 
discharges for chronic fatigue syndrome, sexually transmitted diseases, malaria, 
autism, ALS, sudden infant death syndrome, cervical cancer, and epilepsy were not 
collected by the National Center for Health Statistics. However, the results of this 
regression were still quite similar to those of Models One and Two. The overall 
model R2 was lower, 0.4040, but the variables retained their signs and significance. 
Hospital discharges had a similar elasticity to both total deaths or years of life lost 
with respect to disease research funding; when hospital discharges increased one
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percent, funding increased 0.25 percent. Lobbying was only slightly less profitable 
than in earlier models.
4.5 Regression Analysis Using Combined Data
Combined regressions were performed using various combinations of deaths, 
hospital discharges, and years of life lost. However, these variables are so highly 
correlated that only one measure of the burden of disease was ever significant in any 
equation. Pearson correlation coefficients are shown in Table 4.7. The results of these 
combined regressions are shown in Table 4.8.
Table 4.7
Combined Model Correlation Coefficients
(Prob> 1 r I und erHe: Rho = 0)















Combined Model Regression Results 








*significant at the 0.01 level.
Hospital discharges became insignificant, whether combined with deaths, years 
of life lost, or both. Also, deaths and years of life lost are so closely correlated 
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.977) that both became insignificant when used
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together. As in previous regressions, COMM was never significant, and LOB2 always 
significant. No added information was gained from combining the models.
4.6 Cost of Illness Analysis
Another important measure of the burden of disease on American families is 
the cost of treating the disease. Estimates of the direct costs of treating various 
diseases are shown in Table 4.9. These estimates are taken from a report entitled 
Disease-Specific Estimates of Direct and Indirect Costs of Illness and N.I.H. Support” 
prepared by the N.I.H. in response to a request by the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations (Senate Report 103-318) seeking an explanation of the societal costs of 
various diseases. The report was compiled from data obtained by the separate 
Institutes and allows wide flexibility in the computation of both direct and indirect 
costs, resulting in cost estimates that are “uneven and essentially non-comparable.’'4 
The N.I.H. does not view economic costs as a significant factor to evaluate when 
making research funding allocation decisions.5 However, an examination of the 
relationship between research funding on a disease and the cost of treatment for that 
disease is informative, as even crude cost estimates provide another valuable measure 
of the burden of disease on society.
Another data set was compiled using the information in the Cost of Illness 
report. It was not possible to use the same forty-two diseases as were used previously, 
because cost data was not available for all of them. The cost estimate data set contains 
twenty-six of the original forty-two diseases, plus six additional diseases for which
* Office of the Director, “Disease-Specific Estimates of Direct and Indirect Costs o f Illness and N.I.H. 
Support,” Bethesda, Md.: N.I.H., 1997, p. 2.
5 Disease-Specific Estimates, p4.
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Table 4.9 
Cost of Illness Data
Disease Funds* Direct Costs* Deaths
Allergic Rhinitis $ 1,020 $ 1,211,000 1
Alzheimer’s 244,000 9,345,800 21,397
Arthritis 143,340 10,833,900 2,908
Asthma 8,427 7,648,200 5,667
Cancer 2,027,190 21,040,600 539,508
Breast Cancer 284,930 5,049,700 43,447
Cervical Cancer 45,140 459,100 4,540
Colorectal Cancer 105,580 4,973,200 56,496
Lung Cancer 97,900 3,902,100 152,007
Ovarian Cancer 39,260 688,600 13,342
Prostate Cancer 106,540 3,596,000 34,122
Stroke 111,640 17,362,000 153,041
Liver Disease 119,090 1,115,200 28,881
COPD 59,840 13,251,500 98,647
Diabetes 274,670 27,276,600 61,766
Gallbladder 7,620 4,089,200 2,816
Peptic Ulcer 6,240 3,345,700 1,958
Epilepsy 49,040 2,138,300 1,338
Cardiovascular 753,900 61,104,400 733,262
HIV/Aids 76,050 8,043,200 31,123
Spinal Cord Injury 95,320 7,127,600 5,821
Kidney Disease 186,070 24,349,400 30,586
Multiple Sclerosis 57,920 1,835,500 2,291
Obesity 97,000 33,858,300 2,097
Osteoporosis 82,050 9,055,100 1,172
Otitis Media 4,860 2,006,900 37
Parkinson’s 79,410 1,425,500 11,845
Pneumonia/Flu 44,660 11,164,500 83,717
Psoriasis 3,120 2,024,300 17
Septicemia 9,900 3,006,100 21,679
Sickle Cell 30,310 393,700 507
Tuberculosis 43,760 514,000 1,202
Source: Office of the Director, Estimate of Direct and Indirect Costs of Illness 
and N.I.H. Support. *in thousands of 1984 dollars.
both cost and funding data were available. The diseases included in this data set are 
also shown in Table 4.9. The table also shows the deaths from each disease. The 
analysis was limited to direct economic costs of treatment, as the methods of 
calculating indirect costs were too inconsistent to permit their use.
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A regression analysis was performed using the following equation:
LNFUNDSit = + £LNCOSTit.3 + e, (4.4)
where
LNFUNDSu = Log of 1999 research funding for disease i
LNCOSTjt-j = Log of 1996 direct costs of treating disease i
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 4.10. The model has 
an R2 o f0.2982 and an overall F-statistic of 12.75. The coefficient of LNCOST is 
positive and significant, with an estimate of 0.6839. This estimate represents the 
elasticity of funding with respect to direct cost of treatment, so that a one-percent 
increase in costs causes a 0.6839 percent increase in funding for that disease. This 
result is consistent with the results obtained using the larger cross-sectional data set of 
forty-two diseases with the other measure of burden of disease. Given the N.I.H.’s 
claim that it does not consider the cost of treating an illness as a criterion for allocating 
research funding, this result is surprising. But the cost of treatment may be serving as a 
proxy for omitted variables. For example, there is a strong positive relationship 
between funding and cost of treatment.
Table 4.10 
Cost of Illness Regression Results 
Dependent Variable -  Log of Funding





*significant at the 0.01 level
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4.7 Conclusions
These regressions reveal that the National Institutes of Health is behaving 
rationally when allocating research funds. Allocations are highly correlated with both 
total deaths from a disease and years of life lost to a disease. Both of these findings 
are consistent with previous research. However, we find that allocation is also 
responsive to hospitalization required by a disease; this was not found to be the case in 
the only recent other recent study of N.I.H. distribution of research funds (Gross et 
al.). Using the direct cost of treatment for a disease as a measure of the burden of 
disease exhibited rather low explanatory power in explaining funding, when compared 
to the other measures of burden of disease. The N.I.H. does not assign much weight to 
the cost of treating a disease, even though it is a valid element of the burden of disease 
and, therefore, part of the public interest theory paradigm.
Neither the impact of special interest groups nor public interest variables has 
really been studied in this context before. We find that the N.I.H. does respond to 
political pressure from special interest groups; lobbying plays a role in budget 
allocations. Given that the N.I.H. is a government agency responsible to politicians, 
this is not a surprise. What is surprising is that the communicability of a disease does 
not appear to increase research funding on that disease. We should note that while the 
Congressional bills introduced and bills passed did not influence current funding, this 
negative finding should be cushioned by the fact that political influence may occur in 
Congressional Committees rather than on the floor of Congress. We consider this 
subject in the next chapter.
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CHAPTERS
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH FUNDS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the allocation of N.I.H. research funding across the fifty 
states for the most recent year data is available. This allows us to measure the 
influences of Congressional politics on funding allocation while holding the influence 
of important state characteristics constant. It is also informative to determine what 
state characteristics have a significant impact on N.I.H. funding decisions. The 
equation to be estimated in this case is:
LNFUNDSit= F (State Characteristicsi.i, Congressional Politics,.i) (5.1) 
where State Characteristics are:
LNFUNDSj = N.I.H. research funding for state i in 1999
LNPOPi = Log of population of state / in 1998
LMDj = Log of number of Medical Doctors in state i in 1998
MEDS, = Medical Schools in state t
TIER 1 if State has a Tier 1 or Tier 2 research university 0 otherwise
COTHj = Number of teaching hospitals in state i 
and Congressional Politics are ( for 105th Congress):
CHM = (* ^  Committee chairman is from state i
' 10 otherwise
11 if Ranking committee member is
' 10 otherwise
 from state i
SUB -  (1 subcommittee chairman is from
■ ~ 10 otherwise
1 if itt  i  i   state i 
100
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cijTxj _ 11 if Senator from state / is on Senate Finance Committee 
' “ {0 otherwise
SHELF =
1 if Senator from state i is on Senate Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions Committee 
0 otherwise
HWMj = Number of Representatives from state i on House Ways and Means 
Committee
HAPPj = Number o f Representatives from state i on House Appropriations Committee 
HCOMj = Number of Representatives from state i on House Commerce Committee
5.2 State Characteristics Variables
The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of 1999 N.I.H. research 
funding awarded to state i. There are a number of state characteristics that must be 
considered when evaluating research funding distribution. States with larger 
populations are likely to receive more funding from the N.I.H. than smaller states 
because of more research grant proposals or larger Congressional delegations. 
Therefore state population is included as an explanatory variable. However, 
differences in population cannot completely explain the variation in funding across 
states, as shown in Figure 5.1. The figure plots the log of per capita funding for the 
states receiving the most and the least funding in 1999. As Figure 5.1 shows, there is 
still a large variation in funding awarded to each state even after adjusting for 
population.
States which have a higher number of doctors are likely to submit more 
research proposals to the N.I.H., and the proportion of awards made to MDs has risen 
over the last fifteen years. We expect that greater numbers of MDs will cause an 
increase in funding to that state, but we recognize that the number o f MDs is
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positively correlated with state population, so the measured effect of MDs may be 
reduced due to multicollinearity. Similarly, much research is carried out at accredited 
teaching hospitals, so the variable COTH, which is the number of hospitals in the state 
accredited by the American Association of Medical Colleges Council on Teaching 
Hospitals, should have a positive sign in a regression estimation.
The quality of research institutions in the state is another factor which should 
logically influence the amount of research money a state gets. Data on the ranking of 
research universities was obtained from the Princeton Review (1998). TIER is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of Tier 1 and Tier 2 research universities in 
each state. MEDS measures the number of accredited medical schools in the state, 
according to the American Association of Medical Colleges. Frequently, a medical 
school is part of a Tier 1 or Tier 2 institution, so these variables are correlated with 
MEDS. We expect that all three of these variables should have a positive impact on 
funding.
5J Congressional Politics Variables
A number of variables were constructed to attempt to measure Congressional 
influence in the distribution of N.I.H. research awards among the states. There are 
two Senate Committees and three House of Representatives Committees which have 
some control over health issues in general or the N.I.H. in particular. Membership, 
chairmen, and ranking member statistics are for the 105th Congress elected in 1996. 
Do the states with positions on these powerful committees receive additional funding?
The Senate Finance Committee is primarily known as the tax-writing body of 
the Senate, but it also oversees general health care policies and issues. The committee
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chairman was Roth (R-Delaware) and the ranking member was Moynihan (D-New 
York). The Subcommittee on Health Care chairman was Craig (R-Idaho) and the 
ranking member was Kennedy (D-Massachusetts). There are sixteen members on the 
Finance Committee.
The Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee is specifically 
responsible for public health and biomedical research and development, among many 
other responsibilities. The chairman was Jeffords (R-Vermont) and the ranking 
member was Kennedy (D-Massachusetts). There are three subcommittees which 
influence the National Institutes of Health: Aging, Children and Families, and Public 
Health. The chairman of the Aging Subcommittee was DeWine (R-Ohio), and the 
ranking member was Mikulski (D-Maryland). For Children and Families, the 
chairman was Gregg (R-New Hampshire), and the ranking member was Dodd (D- 
Connecticut). Finally, the chairman of the Public Health Subcommittee was Frist (R- 
Tennessee), and the ranking member was Kennedy (D-Massachusetts).
In the House of Representatives, the three committees which affect the N.I.H. 
are Appropriations, Commerce, and less directly, Ways and Means. The 
Appropriations Committee sets the budget for the N.I.H. It was chaired by Young (R- 
Florida), while the ranking member was Obey (D-Wisconsin). The Labor, Health and 
Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittee was chaired by 
Porter (R-Dlinois) and ranking member Obey.
The House Commerce Committee has primary responsibility for overseeing 
and directing federal health care issues, including biomedical research. The chairman 
was Bliley (R-Virginia) and the ranking member was Dingell (D-Michigan). The
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Health and Environment Subcommittee was chaired by Bilirakis (R-Florida) and the 
ranking member was Brown (D-Ohio).
Finally, the House Ways and Means Committee controls matters relating to 
health care payments made by the government and public health delivery systems. Its 
chairman was Archer (R-Texas) and the ranking member was Rangel (D-New York). 
The Health Subcommittee was chaired by Thomas (R-Califomia), with the ranking 
member being Stark (D-Califomia).
We have constructed several variables to determine if positions on these 
committees and subcommittees affects the distribution of awards. The variable CHM 
is a dummy variable indicating that a delegate from state i is chairman of a committee. 
SUB indicates that a delegate from state / is chairman of a subcommittee. RANK 
indicates that a delegate from state i is the ranking members of a committee or relevant 
subcommittee. Finally, the variables SFIN, SHELP, HAPP, HCOM, and HWM 
measure membership on one of the five committees with some influence over the 
N.I.H. or health care. If members of Congress use their positions to help institutions 
in their states receive grants, then we would expect all or some of these variables to 
have positive signs.
5.4 Regression Results
The results of the geographic distribution regression are shown in Table 5.1. 
The model has an R2 of 0.8957, telling us that the model explains the great majority of 
the variation in funding across states. The model is in logarithmic form, so the 
coefficients represent elasticities. As expected, LNPOP has a significant positive 
impact on the funding a state receives. The elasticity of funding with respect to
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population is 1.1729; an increase of one percent in population causes an increase in 
funding of slightly more than 1.17 percent. Surprisingly, the coefficient on LMD is 
also significant and positive. An increase of one percent in the number of doctors 
causes a 1.2921 percent increase in research funding. States with a higher number of 
doctors do receive additional funding, and an increase in the number of doctors is 
slightly more important than an increase in population.
Table 5.1 
Results of Geographic Regression 
















*significant at the 0.01 level
Evidently, the quantity of research institutions does not drive funding 
allocations. Neither the number of medical schools (MEDS) nor the number of 
teaching hospitals (COTH) was ever significant.
The presence of a Tier 1 or Tier 2 research university has a significant positive 
effect on funding, as expected; apparently, the quality of research institutions does
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matter. States with high-quality institutions are getting more research dollars than 
states without such institutions.
Among the Congressional variables, neither the holding of a chairmanship 
(CHM, SUB) nor being the ranking member (RANK) was significant. For the 
committee membership variables, only membership on the Senate Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions Committee had a significant positive influence on state funding. 
Membership on the House Ways and Means (HWM) Committee was sometimes 
weakly significant.
While these results indicate that contemporary leadership and membership on 
Congressional committees does not play a major role in the allocation of N.I.H. 
research funding across the states, it must be remembered that the N.I.H. is subject to 
incremental budgeting and that the current allocation of N.I.H. funds across the states 
may have been influenced by the leadership and membership composition of 
Congressional Committees from earlier years.
5.5 Conclusions
There is some objective justification for the discrepancies in funding across 
states. States with larger populations, more doctors and nationally respected research 
universities receive more funds than other states. However, Congressional influence 
seems to play a role in funding distribution, as states which have membership on the 
Senate HELP committee have higher funding. As we concluded in Chapter 4, the 
N.I.H. is behaving rationally when allocating funds.
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING MICRO-DATA
6.1 Introduction
In addition to the data on N.I.H. research funding per disease which was 
analyzed earlier, another data set was compiled using micro-level data. The N.I.H. 
maintains a database on government-funded research projects entitled Computer 
Retrieval of Information on Scientific Programs (CRISP). Each individual research 
project funded by the N.I.H. is entered into this database by title, author, and subject. 
It is possible to do a subject search for each disease o f interest to retrieve the grants 
awarded to do research on that disease.
A year-by-year search of the CRISP database was performed in order to 
duplicate the data on research funding collected earlier. Entering the subject 
“Alzheimer’s disease” and the year “ 1990”, for example, will result in 458 hits. Each 
hit represents a research project on Alzheimer’s disease. This process was repeated 
for each of the twenty-one diseases in the original data set for the years 1987 - 2001. 
The diseases are listed in Table 6.1.
The number of grants awarded in a given subject area is a crude measure of the 
emphasis placed on that disease by the N.I.H. It is possible for a grant to have 
multiple subject listings; for example, a research project may cover two or more 
related diseases. There is no way to prevent this double counting when using the 
CRISP data set; however, there is no reason to believe that projects in any one disease 
area are more or less likely to contain multiple subjects than projects in any other area.
108
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Table 6.1 
Diseases in Data Sets
IS Year Data 10 Year Data 1999 Cross Section
Alzheimer’s Alzheimer’s Alzheimer’s
Asthma Asthma Asthma
Breast Cancer Breast Cancer Breast Cancer
Chronic Fatigue All Cancer Cancer
Cystic Fibrosis Chronic Fatigue Cardiovascular
Diabetes Cystic Fibrosis Chronic Fatigue
Epstein-Barr Diabetes Cystic Fibrosis
HIV/Aids Epstein Barr Diabetes
Hypertension HIV/Aids Epstein Barr
Kidney Disease Hypertension HIV/Aids
Lupus Kidney Hypertension
Osteoporosis Lupus Kidney Disease
Parkinson’s Osteoporosis Lupus
Prostate Cancer Parkinson’s Osteoporosis
STD’s Prostate Cancer Parkinson’s
Sickle Cell STD’s Prostate Cancer
Spinal Cord Sickle Cell STD’s
Stroke Spinal Cord Sickle Cell
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The number of awards included in this analysis is quite large, varying from about 
8,800 in 1987 to slightly over 31,000 in 2000.
6.2 Fifteen Year Pooled Data Regression
A regression was performed using the number of grants awarded in a disease 
area as the dependent variable for the years 1987-2001. The model was specified to 
be a one-way fixed effects model, which allows the intercept to vary across diseases 
but not over time. The omitted disease is tuberculosis, as it was in the earlier panel 
data regressions. The equation estimated for Model One was:
N -I
LNGRANTSU = /?, + !  ^ D jt + ftY R + ftDRATIO,., + ftD Y R + (6.1)
ftDYRDTHit + ftCDEM + ftPDEM +eit
where
LNGRANTSu = the log of the number of grants to disease i in year t 
DRATIOjt-j = the number of deaths from disease i in year t divided by the total 
number of deaths for all diseases in year t 
YR = time trend
rj _ 11 if disease i=j 
j‘ 10 otherwise
n v n  -  f 1 if the year is 1999,2000,2001 
UYK 10 otherwise
DYRDTHit = DYR*DRATIOit-3
r n P w  _ f1 if Democrats control the Congress in year t-1 
™ t-' \0  otherwise
Dr,Cw  _ (1 if the President is a Democrat 
-  o otherwise
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The dependent variable is LNGRANTS, which is the log of the number of 
grants awarded in a particular disease area each year. The public interest variable is 
DRATIO, which is the number of deaths from disease / divided by the total number of 
deaths each year from all included diseases. Using this measure of the burden of 
disease prevents increases in the number of deaths each year from affecting the results.
A glance at Figure 6.1, Total Dataset Grants Over Time, shows that the 
number of grants increased over the period. We include a time trend, YR, to capture 
the incremental budgeting effect. In addition, there are several distinct breaks in the 





1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
Figure 6.1: Total Dataset Grants Over Time. Source: Office of Extramural 
Research, Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientific Projects.
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Congress voted to establish a goal of doubling the N.I.H. budget between 1999 and 
2003. The dummy variable DYR takes the value of one for the years 1999, 2000, and 
2001, and is zero in earlier years. The DYR variable measures the impact of this 
decision by Congress on the various diseases. The DYRDTH variable captures any 
interaction between DRATIO and DYR.
Two political dummy variables are included: CDEM and PDEM. These 
variables measure Democratic party control over the Congress and the Presidency, 
respectively, during the year when budget decisions are made (t-1). If the Democrats 
have control, the variables have a value of one; otherwise they take the value of zero. 
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate were controlled by Democrats from 
1986-1994; after the elections in 1994, both bodies were controlled by Republicans 
(1995-2000). The President was a Republican from 1986-1992 and a Democrat from 
1993-2000.
The results of this regression are presented in Table 6.2, along with the results 
of the original regression over this same time period. The regression using CRISP 
data performs reasonably well; it has an R2 of 0.7912. The cross-sectional (disease- 
specific) intercept effects are almost identical; thirteen of the same eighteen diseases 
have intercepts which differ significantly from that of tuberculosis, and the signs are 
the same as those is the funding regression in Chapter 3. There are two differences in 
the CRISP regression and the funding regression: first, the sign for SIDS is positive in 
the funding regression, but negative in the CRISP regression. The explanation for this 
may lie in the crudeness of the number of grants as a measure of allocation, or in the 
method of retrieving the number o f grants (searching by disease subject listing). The
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Table 6.2
Comparison of Fifteen Year Data Regression Results 
Dependent Variable -  Log of Grants (CRISP Model)
Dependent Variable = Lotg of Funding (1Funding Model)
Variable CRISP tfodel Funding Model
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Alzheimer’s 1.6832 7.21* 2.4993 16.24*
Asthma 0.8122 3.84* 1.1084 8.08*
Breast Cancer 1.8317 4.78* 2.4693 9.41*
Chronic Fatigue -1.1483 -5.46* -1.6679 -12.24*
Cystic Fibrosis 0.4546 2.16** 1.0001 7.35*
Diabetes 2.1290 5.02* 2.7550 9.42*
Epstein-Barr 0.0370 0.18 -0.0437 -0.32
HIV/Aids 2.2844 8.66* 4.0043 22.64*
Hypertension 1.9407 8.86* 2.0703 14.39*
Kidney Disease 2.1190 7.20* 2.2381 11.27*
Lupus 0.3320 1.58 0.4329 3.18*
Osteoporosis 0.5376 2.56** 1.4129 10.38*
Parkinson’s 0.7095 3.28* 1.2938 9.19*
Prostate Cancer 0.9392 3.01* 1.0357 4.90*
STD’s 0.2735 1.30 1.5348 11.26*
Sickle Cell 0.3462 1.65 0.8206 6.03*
Spinal Cord 1.1927 5.63* 0.9156 6.66*
Stroke 1.4826 1.30 1.7077 2.14**
SIDS -1.2022 -5.69* 0.7814 5.70*
Intercept 3.8530 15.89* 8.6366 54.98*
Yr 0.1071 4.74* 0.1006 6.88*
Dratio -0.8960 -0.31 -0.2619 -0.06
Dyr 0.6683 4.97* 0.1130 -1.30
Dyrdth 0.3175 0.32 1.2010 0.88
Cdem 0.3432 2.63* 0.1741 2.06**
Pdem -0.2025 -1.40 -0.0053 -0.06
*significant at the 0.01 level. “ significant at the 0.05 level.
other difference is that in the funding regression, the intercepts for lupus, sickle cell 
disease, sexually transmitted diseases, and stroke do vary significantly from that of 
tuberculosis, while in the CRISP regression, this is not the case.
Another similarity between the regression using CRISP data and that using 
research funding is that in both regressions, the time trend is significant and positive, 
supporting the incremental budgeting theory. With disease dummy variables included
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in the model, the number of deaths from a disease has no explanatory power; DRATIO 
is not significant in either model. This lack of significance for DRATIO was 
confirmed using joint F-tests for DRATIO and DYRDTH. PDEM is never significant 
in the fifteen year models.
The political dummy variable CDEM, which measures the effect of 
Democratic control of Congress during the period, is positive and significant in both 
models. This give us important additional evidence that politics does matter in 
determining funding; both models show a decrease in funding after the Republicans 
took control of Congress.
The dummy variable DYR is positive and significant in the CRISP model, but 
not in the funding model. The decision by Congress to substantially increase N.I.H. 
funding beginning in 1999 had a positive impact on the number of grants. The 
discrepancy between the CRISP result and the funding model result on this variable 
may be due to the crudeness of number of grants as a funding estimate, or the number 
of grants may have varied more than the amount of funding at that time. DYRDTH is 
not significant in either model. Overall, the CRISP data confirms the results of our 
earlier estimation using funding dollars as the dependent variable.
6J Ten Year Pooled Data Regression
The CRISP data was expanded to include twenty-seven diseases for the years 
1992-2001, to provide a basis for comparison with the ten year data set regressions 
results presented earlier. The diseases are listed in Table 6.1. The equation estim ated 
below for Model Two was the same as that estimated previously in Equation 6.1; all of 
the variables have the same meanings.
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The results for this ten year panel data are shown in Table 6.3, along with the 
results from the ten year regression using dollar funding. The CRISP model has an R2
Table 6.3
Comparison of Ten Year Data Regression Results 
Dependent Variable = Log of Grants (CRISP Model)
_________ Dependent Variable = Log of Funding (Funding Model)__________
CIRSP Model Funding Model
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Alzheimer’s 1.2490 4.32* 1.8360 20.65*
Asthma 0.4181 1.64 0.4942 6.29*
Breast Cancer 1.2150 2.76* 2.0042 14.80*
Cardiovascular -0.6581 -0.11 3.3323 1.73
Chronic Fatigue -1.5573 -6.14* -2.2042 -28.26*
Cystic Fibrosis 0.0721 0.28 0.1888 2.42**
Diabetes 1.3406 2.55** 1.8837 11.64*
Epstein-Barr -0.4482 -1.77 -0.9128 -11.70*
HIV/Aids 1.7492 5.03* 3.3099 30.94*
Hypertension 1.3099 4.91* 1.1772 14.33*
Kidney Disease 1.3027 3.77* 1.3837 13.01*
Lupus -0.2470 -0.98 -0.4289 -5.51*
Osteoporosis 0.1959 0.77 0.7117 9.14*
Parkinson’s 0.2743 1.04 0.5486 6.79*
Prostate Cancer 0.4698 1.26 0.6717 5.85*
STD’s -0.1508 -0.60 -0.7222 9.26*
Sickle Cell -0.1778 -0.70 -0.0715 -0.92
Spinal Cord 0.5766 2.26** 0.0222 0.28
Stroke 0.3569 0.28 1.0084 2.61*
SIDS -1.7631 -6.93* -0.1335 -1.71
COPD -1.2820 -1.57 0.0046 0.02
Liver Disease 1.0003 2.88* 1.1560 10.82*
Lung Cancer 0.3101 0.24 0.9540 2.42**
Pneumonia/Influenza 0.1051 0.14 0.1368 0.60
Schizophenia 0.6364 2.51** 0.9379 12.03*
Intercept 3.4403 11.67* 10.1988 125.66*
Yr 4.4088 8.63* 0.0467 3.06*
Dratio 0.4284 0.35 -0.7688 -0.20
Dyr -0.2859 -1.61 0.0626 1.14
Dyrdth -0.0567 -0.06 0.0804 0.28
Cdem 1.1541 7.20* 0.0153 0.31
Pdem -0.7663 -5.14* 0.0277 0.60
♦significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
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of 0.7993. The cross-sectional effects are somewhat different in the two models. In 
the CRISP regression, only eleven diseases have intercepts which differ significantly 
from that of tuberculosis, compared to nineteen in the funding data regression. The 
signs on the significant coefficients are the same in both models.
The time trend is positive and significant in the both the regression using 
CRISP grants and the regression using funding dollars as the dependent variable, 
providing support for the incremental budgeting theory. Neither DYR nor DRYDTH 
is significant in either model. However, the time-based political dummy variables 
CDEM and PDEM are both significant in the CRISP model; only CDEM was 
significant in the funding model. Given our earlier results in the fifteen year panel 
data (both CRISP and funding models), these ten year CRISP data regression 
estimation results lend more support to the idea that political factors do influence 
funding. We certainly cannot conclude that there are no political effects at work.
Also, the public interest variable DRATIO is not significant in either model 
when disease dummy variables are included in the model. While there are more 
differences between the CRISP model and the funding model for the ten year data than 
there are for the fifteen year data, the important result that initial levels of funding for 
diseases are maintained over time (incremental budgeting) is supported by both 
models; as is the result that politics matters in the funding process.
6.4 Cross-Sectional Data Regression
Finally, CRISP grant award data was used to replicate the results of the 1999 
cross-sectional analysis presented earlier in Table 4.2. The diseases in the cross 
section are listed in Table 6.1. The number of grants awarded in forty-two disease
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categories served as the dependent variable. The equation estimated for Model Three 
was:
LNGRANTS; = + #LNDEATHSit., + A  LOB, ,+ A LOB 1,., +
ALOB2,., + /?6COMM (6.3)
where
LNGRANTSi = log of the number of grants awarded to disease i in 1999
LNDEATHSi.3  = log of the number of deaths from disease i in 1996
r n n  _ i 1 ^  the disease had a registered lobbyist group which spent less than $100,000 
LUB 10 otherwise
r n n , _  ( I if disease advocates spent between $100,000 and $200,000 lobbying 
LUBl 10 otherwise
r n w  _ f 1 if disease advocates spent over $200,000 
L u a z  10 otherwise
COMM = P  ^  a disease is communicable 
(0 otherwise
The dependent variable is the log of the number of grants awarded to disease / 
in 1999. The public interest variables are the log of the number of deaths from disease 
i in 1996 (LNDEATHS), and COMM, indicating whether or not a disease is 
contagious. The special interest group variables here are LOB, LOB1, and LOB2. 
LOB has a value of one if a disease has a registered lobbyist and spent less than 
$100,000 lobbying during the 1997-1998 election cycle, and a value of zero otherwise. 
LOB1 represents lobbying expenditures between $100,000 and $200,000, and LOB2 
represents lobbying expense above $200,000 during the 1997-1998 election cycle. It 
is not possible to use CDEM and PDEM in a cross-sectional analysis, because the 
controlling party does not change.
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The results of the cross-sectional regression are presented in Table 6.4, along 
with the results of the earlier regression using funding as the dependent variable. 
There are some differences. The CRISP model has a much smaller Rz, 0.4001 versus
0.5721 for the funding model. However, in both models, the public interest variables 
have the same signs and significance. LNDEATHS is positive and significant, as 
expected, indicating that both funding levels among diseases and the number of grants 
awarded in 1999 are related to the burden of disease on the public. LOB2 is 
significant and positive in both models; the other special interest group variables are 
always insignificant. Very low levels of lobbying do not appear to result in additional 
funding for any disease, while high lobbying levels do provide a reward.
Table 6.4
Comparison of Cross Sectional Data Regression Results 
Dependent Variable = Log of Grants (CRISP Model)
__________ Dependent Variable = Log of Funding (Funding Model)__________
Variable CRIS1* Model Funding Model
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Intercept 4.7794 11.33* 9.1447 20.14*
Lndeaths 0.1400 2.83* 0.2264 4.28*
Lob 0.0704 0.18 0.4029 0.95
Lobl 0.6511 1.35 0.6728 1.28
Lob2 0.8750 2.55** 1.2466 3.37*
Comm 0.3382 0.80 0.4453 0.97
•significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
The CRISP data was also used to replicate the cross-sectional regressions using 
years of life lost (YLL) and the number of hospital discharges (DISCHARGES) as 
explanatory variables. The results of the estimation using YLL is shown in Table 6.5. 
The CRISP regression reproduces the results using funding as the dependent variable 
quite well. Both the burden of disease measure, years of life lost (LNYLL), and 
LOB2, representing large lobbying dollar amounts, were significant and positive in
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Table 6.5
Comparison of Cross Section Results Using YLL 
Dependent Variable = Log of Grants (CRISP Model) 
Dependent Variable = Log of Funding (Funding Model)
Variable CRIS P Model Funding Model
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Intercept 4.4334 7.53* 8.4337 13.42*
Lnyll 0.1329 2.51** 0.2299 4.08*
Lob 0.0895 0.22 0.4243 0.98
Lobl 0.6145 1.25 0.6307 1.19
Lob2 0.9172 2.64** 1.2840 3.43*
Comm 0.3367 0.78 0.4319 0.92
*significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
both regressions. The remaining variables, LOB, LOB1, and COMM, were not 
significant in either regression.
The estimation of the hospital discharge equation was also repeated using the 
number of grants as the dependent variable. These results are shown in Table 6.6. 
Once again, the reduced number of cross-sectional observations (thirty-four), made it 
necessary to eliminate some explanatory variables. Consequently, only discharges 
(LNDISCH), the large lobbying variable (LOB2), and the contagious disease variable 
(COMM) were included in this estimation. The results using the CRISP grant data are 
similar to the results achieved using the funding data. Lobbying has a positive, 
significant impact on funding in both models. COMM is not significant in either 
model. Surprisingly, the coefficient on discharges (LNDISCH) is not significant in 
the model using CRISP data, whereas it is significant in the funding model. This 
represents the only major difference in the cross-sectional results between the CRISP 
models and the models using funding as the dependent variable.
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Table 6.6
Comparison of Cross Section Results Using Discharges 
Dependent Variable = Log of Grants (CRISP Model) 
Dependent Variable -  Log of Funding (Funding Model)
Variable CRIS P Model Funding Model
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Intercept 5.6812 12.38* 10.2517 19.57*
Lndisch 0.1249 1.19 0.2560 2.14**
Lob2 0.7079 1.87** 1.0814 2.48**
Comm 0.3098 0.63 0.3239 0.57
*significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level
6.5 Conclusions
The use of the micro-level data provided by the CRISP grants registry was 
helpful in confirming the results obtained using the macro-level funding data. In all 
three regressions, using fifteen year panel data, ten year panel data, and 1999 cross- 
sectional data, the CRISP regression results generally validated our earlier results. 
The level of N.I.H. funding varies significantly across the various diseases. When the 
influence of the diseases are accounted for, the disease death ratio (DRATIO) has no 
influence on N.I.H. grant decisions. When disease dummy variables are not included 
in the model, the disease death ratio has a significant, positive influence on N.I.H. 
grants, which is consistent with the public interest hypothesis.
The CRISP data analysis provided solid supplemental support for the 
incremental budgeting theory and special interest group theory; the time trend and the 
large lobbying variable were always significant and positive. In addition, the CRISP 
results bolstered our confidence in the result attained with the fifteen year panel data 
funding model that political factors influence funding. Considering our pooled data 
CRISP models and our pooled data funding models together, we found evidence that 
politics mattered in three o f the four regressions.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The National Institutes o f Health is the largest biomedical research facility in 
the world, and the largest non-military research agency of the United States federal 
government. The N.I.H. received over $20 billion in tax-dollar funding for the fiscal 
year 2001; the decisions made by the N.I.H. about funding priorities affect the lives of 
all Americans. Consequently, an analysis of the resource allocation process at the 
N.I.H. is o f substantial interest.
Our model hypothesizes that the N.I.H. policy-makers follow a combination of 
public interest, incremental budgeting, and special interest group economic theory. 
They must respond to both the health care demands of the public, as well as the 
political demands of Congress, the President, disease advocacy associations, patients, 
and other special interest groups. Our primary goals are to determine whether the 
N.I.H. is responding to the burden of disease on the U.S. population when making 
resource allocation decisions, to evaluate the role of political and special interest 
groups in the allocation process, to determine whether or not the N.I.H. follows the 
incremental budgeting model, and to examine the distribution of research funds across 
states as well as across diseases. We used both pooled time-series cross-sectional data 
and pure cross-sectional data to perform our analyses.
When analyzing panel data on research funding for a pool of twenty-one 
diseases during the period 1987-2001, we found evidence that the N.I.H. considers the 
death ratio from a disease as a significant factor in making the initial funding 
allocations. Our results indicated that these initial allocations are maintained over
121
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time, and that the N.I.H. does not alter the distribution o f funding in response to 
changing death patterns. We identified persistent variations in the levels o f funding 
across diseases, even after controlling for deaths. We included a time trend variable to 
explicitly test for the incremental budgeting effect, and found it to be present. Our 
results both substantiate and amplify the work of Niskanen (1971) and Weston (1994), 
who found some evidence of incrementalism. Our study, however, is the first to use 
disease-level data in this context, eliminating the institute-disease identification 
problem present in the work of Mushkin (1979) and Weston (1994). We also found 
that the shift from a Democratic Congress to a Republican Congress in 1995 reduced 
funding.
This analysis was repeated using ten years of data (1992-2001) for twenty- 
seven diseases. This data set included heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, pneumonia and influenza, and liver disease, which are major causes o f death 
in the United States. Our study was the first to include all of these diseases, and the 
first to include all of the top ten causes of death over the last fifteen years in the U.S. 
Including these diseases in such a study greatly improves the relevance o f the results. 
No previous study considered such data in this quantity or detail. Our results 
substantiate the incremental budgeting theory; after initial allocations are made, the 
funding allocations do not appear to change significantly in response to deaths. We 
did find, however, that the shift from a Democratic to Republican Congress did not 
have a significant effect in this regression. Our results concerning political influence, 
then, were mixed; however, we cannot exclude the possibility that politics plays a role 
in funding allocations.
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We performed an extensive cross-sectional analysis of the N.I.H. research 
funding allocation among forty-two diseases for the fiscal year 1999. We included 
four measures of the burden of disease (deaths, years of life lost, hospital discharges, 
and communicability) as explanatory variables representing the public interest. Three 
o f these measures had significant positive impacts on research funding allocations, 
providing support for the argument that the N.I.H. is now allocating funds, at least in 
part, in accordance with public interest theory. Our findings were slightly different 
than those of Gross et al. (1999), who found that both deaths and years o f life lost 
mattered, but that hospital discharges were not significant. However, our cross- 
section included fifty percent more diseases than theirs, and the disease categories 
were more specific, which may account for the difference. The communicability of a 
disease was not considered by Gross et al.; surprisingly, we never found it to be a 
significant factor in determining research funding allocation.
Our study is the first to consider the effect of the direct cost o f treatment 
(another measure o f the burden of disease) on research funding allocations. An 
analysis of a cross-section of thirty-four diseases also found a significant, positive 
relationship between the cost o f treating a disease and research funding, even though 
the N.I.H. does not explicitly consider this measure of the burden of disease when 
making allocation decisions.
In addition, we expanded the 1999 cross-sectional analyses to include variables 
to measure the impact o f lobbying efforts on the allocation process. We found that 
diseases which had extensive Congressional lobbying expenses received additional 
funding, providing support for the special interest group theory o f government
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behavior. Although Stigler (1974), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983) developed 
special interest group theory and applied it in other forums, ours is the first to include 
a quantitative evaluation of the effect of lobbying on research funding at the N.I.H. 
We also evaluated the effect of the introduction of bills in Congress requesting 
additional research funding for specific diseases, but found no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the introduction of a bill affected current N.I.H. funding.
We examined the distribution of research funding for fiscal year 2000 across 
the fifty individual states to determine whether the distribution depended entirely on 
quantifiable factors, or whether political factors played a role. None of the earlier 
work on the N.I.H. considered the distribution across states. We identified six state 
characteristic variables which could justify an increased level of funding, as well as 
eight Congressional political variables which might affect the funding a state receives. 
Our results provided support for both the public interest and special interest group 
theories of allocation. The population, number of medical doctors and the quality of 
research institutions in the state were significant and positive factors in a state’s 
funding level; however, having a Senator on the Senate Health, Labor, Education, and 
Pensions Committee apparently contributed to an increase in the state’s funding. 
Whether this effect was entirely due to current membership on the Committee, or was 
an accumulated effect incorporating membership in prior years, or whether this 
variable acted a proxy for some other omitted variable, could not be determined.
Finally, we replicated our evaluations of all three of the disease-related data 
sets (fifteen-year panel, ten-year panel, and 1999 cross section) using micro-level data 
obtained from the CRISP registry o f individual N.I.H. grant awards. The number of
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grants included in the study varied from 8,800 to over 31,000. Our results using 
grants as the dependent variable measuring N.I.H. spending on a disease essentially 
substantiated our earlier results, especially our conclusions regarding the presence of 
incremental budgeting and the influence of lobbying. One result was that using the 
CRISP data for both the fifteen and ten year datasets, we found evidence that the 
change from a Democratic Congress to a Republican Congress reduced funding. 
Thus, in three of our four pooled data regressions, we found evidence that politics 
does affect research funding. This confirmation of our macro-level results boosts our 
confidence in the validity of our findings. While Lichtenberg (1996) was the first to 
use CRISP data in a cross-sectional evaluation of research funding, we have expanded 
the application by incorporating panel data from the CRISP database.
A number o f additional issues remain to be examined concerning the N.I.H. 
The N.I.H. is improving its record-keeping and data-processing methods in response 
to Congressional and public concerns. This, in turn, will improve our ability to 
evaluate the allocation process in the future. The N.I.H. has been advised by Congress 
to be more explicit in their consideration of the burdens of disease when making 
allocation decisions, and more communicative about the allocation process.
Our study does not include data on the incidence or prevalence of various 
diseases, because the data available is spotty and inconsistent; for many diseases, no 
government records are available for either incidence or prevalence. This is critical 
information that needs to be compiled and made readily available for future 
researchers in order to comprehensively evaluate public policy on research allocation 
among diseases.
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The relationship between Congress and the N.I.H. warrants further study. We 
hope to evaluate the role of Congress in determining changes in the direction of N.I.H. 
research. In addition, the issue of selectivity bias needs to be addressed. We need 
access to information about both the funded and unfunded N.I.H. research grant 
applications to more fairly and completely analyze the research priorities o f the N.I.H.
As the population of the United States ages during the 21st century, the 
National Institutes of Health will play a progressively larger role in improving the 
health of the American people. A thorough understanding of the N.I.H. decision­
making process and the research agency’s priorities will be an essential part of 
managing our own health, and therefore, our lives.
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Leading Causes Of Death
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1984 Heart




















































Disease Cancer Stroke COPD Accidents
Pneumonia/
Influenza Diabetes Suicide HIV/Aids Homicide
1992 Heart
Disease Cancer Stroke COPD Accidents
Pneumonia/
Influenza Diabetes HIV/Aids Suicide Homicide
1993 Heart
Disease Cancer Stroke COPD Accidents
Pneumonia/
Influenza Diabetes HIV/Aids Suicide Homicide
1994 Heart
Disease Cancer Stroke COPD Accidents
Pneumonia/




Disease Cancer Stroke COPD Accidents
Pneumonia/
Influenza Diabetes HIV/Aids Suicide
Liver
Disease




















Disease Cancer Stroke COPD Accidents
Pneumonia/























Computation Of Dummy Variable Estimates
1. Let lny = px + /5U + <5D + e 
where
2. Then lny, = (/?, + S)+ /3U,. When D = I, and lny0 = /7, + /?,x0when D = 0.
3. Then lny, -  lny0 = S.
4. Then ln(— ) = lny, -  lny0 = S.
yo
5. T h e n —  = e J.
y«
6. Therefore, —— — = eJ -  1.
y0
7. The percent change in y = eJ -  I when D = 1 versus D = 0.




N.I.H. Budget Fiscal Year 1999
Institute Amount*
National Cancer Institute $2,900,435
National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute 1,781,389
National Institute o f Dental and Craniofacial Research 238,163
National Institute o f Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases 996,189
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke 898,521
National Institute o f Allergy and Infectious Diseases 1,575,065
National Institute o f General Medical Sciences 1,196,798
National Institute o f Child Health and Human Development 752,909
National Eye Institute 396,634
National Institute o f Environmental Health Sciences 388,228
National Institute on Aging 599,741
National Institute o f Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases 307,080
National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders 231,295
National Institute o f Mental Health 854,640
National Institute on Drug Abuse 607,579
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 259,030
National Institute o f Nursing Research 69,985
National Human Genome Research Institute 268,901
National Center for Research Resources 554,270
National Center for Complimentary and Alternative Medicine 49,967
Fogarty International Center 35.391
National Library o f Medicine 181,131
Office of the Director 43,436
Building and Facilities 6,100
TOTAL 515,597,189
Source: N.I.H.. http://www4.od.nih.aov/ofm/budpet/. * in thousands o 'dollars.



































Sexually Transmitted Diseases 136,400
Sickle Cell Disease 50,400
Spinal Cord Injury 62,100
Stroke 186,000
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 49,300
Tuberculosis 72,800
Source: N.I.H., http://www4.od.nih.gov/ofm/diseases/. * in thousands of dollars.
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